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Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy for Generalized Anxiety Disorder: 
Examining the Patterns of Symptom Change and the Role of Intolerance of Uncertainty 
Eleanor Donegan 
Generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) is characterized by excessive worry and somatic 
symptoms of anxiety (e.g., restlessness, muscle tension) (DSM-IV-TR, 2000). Although 
efficacious treatments have been developed, little is known about the nature and 
predictors of symptom change during treatment. Dugas and colleagues have developed a 
cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT) for GAD which has been found to be efficacious in 
reducing worry and somatic anxiety in pre-to-posttreatment analyses (e.g., Dugas et al., 
2010). This CBT is based on a cognitive model (Dugas et al., 1998) which implicates 
intolerance of uncertainty in the development and maintenance of GAD. The first goal of 
this study was to examine the nature of GAD symptom change during CBT. The second 
goal was to examine the role of intolerance of uncertainty, and its two component factors, 
in GAD symptom change. The results indicated that there was a bidirectional relationship 
between changes in worry and changes in somatic anxiety during treatment. In addition, 
intolerance of uncertainty was found to partially mediate GAD symptom change over 
time. However, different mediational roles were identified for the two factors, which 
represent distinct sets of beliefs about uncertainty. Specifically, Factor 2 (i.e., Uncertainty 
is unfair and spoils everything), was a stronger mediator of GAD symptom change than 
Factor 1 (i.e., Uncertainty has negative self-referential and behavioural implications). The 
theoretical and clinical implications of these findings are discussed. 
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Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy for Generalized Anxiety Disorder: 
Examining the Patterns of Symptom Change and the Role of Intolerance of Uncertainty 
Generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) is a chronic condition characterized by 
excessive worry and somatic symptoms of anxiety (e.g., irritability, muscle tension) 
(American Psychiatric Association [DSM-IV-TR], 2000). GAD is also associated with 
substantial personal and societal costs, including impairment in social and occupational 
functioning (Hoffman, Dukes, & Wittchen, 2008). Fortunately, several psychological 
treatments have been developed and are efficacious in reducing GAD symptoms (e.g., 
Borkovec & Costello, 1993; Roemer & Orsillo, 2007). However, recovery rates of only 
50-60% at posttreatment are common (Fisher, 2006) and there is clearly a need to 
improve treatment efficacy. 
In order to refine existing treatment protocols, an understanding of how and why 
symptoms change during treatment is essential. However, studies examining the efficacy 
of psychological treatments have typically involved pre-to-posttreatment mean 
comparisons of symptoms or comparisons between treatment conditions at a given point 
in time (Laurenceau, Hayes, & Feldman, 2007). Although these analyses can reveal 
whether a particular treatment is associated with significant changes in symptoms by 
posttreatment, we know surprisingly little about what occurs during efficacious treatment 
programs. Specifically, we know little about typical patterns of symptom change or about 
the extent to which theoretically relevant variables predict symptom change. 
Treatment Process Research 
A growing body of research has begun to address this gap in our knowledge by 
relying on multi-wave longitudinal data in analyses designed to address treatment process 
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questions. This research is beginning to reveal the interrelationships between 
constellations of symptoms as they change during psychological treatments (e.g., 
Moskovitch, Hofinann, Suvak, & In-Albon, 2005; Roelofs, Huibers, Peters, Arntz, & Os, 
2008), the rates of symptom change over time (e.g., Nishith, Resick, & Griffin, 2002; 
Penava, Otto, Maki, & Pollack, 1998), and the relationships between potential 
mechanisms of change and changes in targeted symptoms (e.g., Hoffart, Sexton, Hedley, 
& Martinsen, 2008; Hofinann et al., 2007; Teachman, Smith-Janik, & Marker, 2008). 
A recent study by Hofman et al. (2007) provides an example of a multi-wave 
study in which analyses were conducted to address process-related questions. The authors 
wished to determine whether changes in catastrophic beliefs about panic symptoms 
served as a mechanism of symptom change in two different treatments for panic disorder 
(i.e., cognitive-behavioural therapy and pharmacotherapy). Statistical models of 
mediation (Baron & Kenny, 1986) were computed for each treatment condition to 
determine the extent to which change over time in panic symptoms (measured at 
pretreatment, posttreatment, and six months following treatment) were mediated by 
changes over the same period of time in panic-related beliefs. A partial mediation effect 
was found in the cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT) condition, with reductions in 
panic-related beliefs accounting for approximately 20-30% of the observed changes in 
panic symptoms. In contrast, no mediation effect was found in pharmacotherapy. These 
results are consistent with theoretical models of the role played by cognitive factors in 
symptom change during treatments that specifically target negative cognitions. However, 
as the authors cautioned, their analyses did not test the reverse mediation effect (i.e., that 
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changes in panic symptoms might have mediated change in panic-related beliefs). Thus, 
the hypothesized mediating effects could not be established conclusively. 
In other treatment process research, Moscovitch, Hofmann, Suvak, and In-Albon 
(2005) examined the patterns of symptom change during a 12-week CBT for social 
anxiety disorder. Prior research using pre-to-posttreatment mean comparisons had 
demonstrated that this CBT produced significant reductions in both social anxiety and 
depressive symptoms. Given that the treatment targeted only social anxiety explicitly, 
however, the authors argued that, during treatment, reductions in social anxiety would 
lead to subsequent reductions in depressive symptoms. Similar to Hofman et al. (2007), 
the authors computed a series of statistical mediation models to examine how these two 
constellations of symptoms, which were measured on a weekly basis, changed as a 
function of time and in relation to one another during CBT. The results indicated that 
while both social anxiety and depressive symptoms decreased significantly over time, 
decreases in social anxiety fully mediated (and accounted for 91% of) decreases in 
depressive symptoms. The authors also tested the reverse mediation relationship and 
found that decreases in depressive symptoms only partially mediated (and accounted for 
only 6% of) decreases in social anxiety. It was therefore argued that during CBT for 
social anxiety, depression improved during treatment because social anxiety improved, 
whereas social anxiety improved largely via mechanisms unrelated to changes in 
depression. 
The multi-wave research designs and data analysis strategies described here have 
the potential to help researchers identify the nature and predictors of symptom change 
during efficacious psychological treatments. Given the potential value of treatment 
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process research, the overarching goal of the present study was to attempt to add to this 
growing literature by examining the patterns of symptom change, and a potential 
mechanism of this change, during an efficacious cognitive-behavioural therapy for GAD. 
A Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy for GAD 
The CBT protocol to be examined here was developed by Dugas and colleagues 
(Dugas & Ladouceur, 2000) and was designed to target GAD specifically. To date, four 
treatment outcome studies have demonstrated that this protocol leads to significant 
reductions in GAD-specific and associated symptoms. When compared to a waitlist 
condition, for example, this CBT was associated with higher rates of GAD diagnostic 
remission and greater change on measures of worry, somatic anxiety, and depressive 
symptoms (Ladouceur et al., 2000). Similar results were found when CBT was 
administered in a group format (Dugas et al., 2003). When compared to a non-directive 
treatment, CBT was associated with higher rates of diagnostic remission at posttreatment 
(65% vs. 20%) (Gosselin, Ladouceur, Morin, Dugas, & Baillargeon, 2006). Finally, when 
compared to applied relaxation training, although CBT was approximately equivalent to 
applied relaxation in symptom reduction at posttreatment, CBT was superior on a 
clinician-rated measure of global clinical improvement. Furthermore, although treatment 
gains were maintained in the applied relaxation condition over a 2-year follow-up period, 
only CBT was associated with continued improvement on measures of worry, trait 
anxiety, and global clinical improvement over the follow-up period (Dugas et al., 2010). 
The studies described above have relied predominantly on pre-to-posttreatment 
mean comparisons of GAD symptoms at specific points in time and have helped to 
establish the efficacy of the CBT protocol developed by Dugas and colleagues. However, 
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establishing the patterns of symptom change that occur during treatment is an important 
first step in understanding the nature of typical symptom change (Laurenceau, Hayes, & 
Feldman, 2007). To date, only one study has examined patterns of symptom change in 
the current CBT protocol. Dugas, Francis and Bouchard (2009) used time-series analysis 
to examine the temporal precedence of changes in worry and somatic anxiety in a 
previous clinical trial of the CBT examined here. The authors tested whether changes in 
daily ratings of worry preceded and predicted changes in daily ratings of somatic anxiety, 
or whether the reverse was true. Significant effects in both directions were found for 
eight out of the ten participants in their sample and the authors concluded that a 
bidirectional relationship exists between changes in worry and changes in somatic 
anxiety during CBT. However, a sample size of 10 is small by conventional standards. 
Thus, further research is needed to determine the precise interrelationships between 
changes in GAD-specific symptoms in the current treatment protocol. 
Intolerance of Uncertainty and GAD 
Refining existing treatments for GAD requires knowledge not only of the nature 
of symptom change, but also of the variables that bring about this change. The CBT 
protocol examined here was derived from a theoretical model which implicates 
intolerance of uncertainty in the development and maintenance of GAD symptoms 
(Dugas, Gagnon, Ladouceur, & Freeston, 1998). In this context, intolerance of 
uncertainty is understood as a dispositional characteristic resulting from a set of negative 
beliefs about uncertainty (e.g., "Uncertainty is upsetting and should be avoided") (Dugas 
& Robichaud, 2007). Consistent with cognitive models of psychopathology (e.g., Beck & 
Clark, 1997), these negative beliefs are thought to lead to biased information processing 
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in situations with uncertain outcomes. For example, individuals who are intolerant of 
uncertainty might be more likely to make threatening interpretations of ambiguous 
situations, leading to elevated levels of worry and anxiety (see Dugas & Robichaud, 
2007, for a discussion of possible alternate causal paths from intolerance of uncertainty to 
GAD symptoms). 
Research using the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS; Buhr & Dugas, 2002; 
Freeston, Rheaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994; see Measures) has provided 
some support for both the specificity of intolerance of uncertainty to GAD symptoms and 
for the causal role that this cognitive variable might play in the onset and maintenance of 
excessive worry and GAD diagnostic status. For instance, intolerance of uncertainty and 
worry have been found to be highly related among non-clinical individuals, and to remain 
significantly related even when controlling for scores on measures of anxiety and 
depressive symptoms (Buhr & Dugas, 2002; Dugas, Freeston, & Ladouceur, 1997; 
Freeston et al., 1994). In clinical samples, individuals with GAD have been found to have 
higher levels of intolerance of uncertainty than individuals with other anxiety disorders 
(e.g., obsessive-compulsive disorder, social anxiety disorder, panic disorder) (Dugas, 
Marchand, & Ladouceur, 2005; Ladouceur et al., 1999). Among individuals with GAD, 
scores on the IUS have been found to distinguish individuals with moderate and severe 
levels of GAD symptoms from individuals with mild GAD symptoms (Dugas et al., 
2007). Finally, Ladouceur, Gosselin, and Dugas (2000) manipulated levels of intolerance 
of uncertainty experimentally among non-clinical individuals and found that those with 
higher manipulated levels of intolerance of uncertainty experienced higher levels of 
worry than individuals with lower manipulated levels of intolerance of uncertainty. 
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Given the evidence of a strong and specific relationship between intolerance of 
uncertainty and GAD symptoms, and given the potential causal role of intolerance of 
uncertainty in the etiology of excessive worry and GAD diagnostic status, one would 
expect that changes in intolerance of uncertainty during a psychological treatment that 
targets this variable would lead to subsequent reductions in GAD symptoms. Consistent 
with this assumption, when Dugas and Ladouceur (2000) conducted time-series analyses 
on the data from four individuals who underwent 16 sessions of CBT, they found that 
changes in intolerance of uncertainty preceded and predicted changes in daily ratings of 
the time spent worrying for three of the four individuals in the study. This effect almost 
reached statistical significance for the fourth individual. Changes in time spent worrying, 
in contrast, did not predict change in intolerance of uncertainty in any of the four 
individuals. In a larger sample of individuals with GAD (N= 52), Dugas et al. (2003) 
found that scores on the IUS accounted for a significant proportion of variance in change 
scores in a composite measure of GAD symptoms. This effect was found even when 
scores on measures of non-specific therapy factors were controlled (e.g., therapist 
characteristics, client expectations for treatment outcome, and client motivation). 
The studies conducted thus far provide support for the hypothesis that intolerance 
of uncertainty may be implicated in the maintenance of GAD symptoms and, in theory, in 
their reduction during treatment. However, the potentially important mediational role of 
intolerance of uncertainty during CBT has not yet been established. The study by Dugas 
and Ladouceur (2000), for instance, was conducted with only four individuals and 
involved an analysis of a single item from the IUS and its relation to daily ratings of 
worry for each participant. Although the study by Dugas et al. (2003) involved a larger 
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sample, the temporal relationships between changes in intolerance of uncertainty and 
GAD symptoms were not assessed. Thus, further research is required to establish the 
specific role that intolerance of uncertainty might play in GAD symptom reduction 
during treatment. 
One additional reason to examine the role of intolerance of uncertainty in GAD 
symptom reduction is that recent research examining this construct suggests that it may 
be composed of two distinct but related factors. In two large and recent factor analyses, 
Sexton and Dugas (2009) found that the first factor of the IUS was based on beliefs 
relating to the idea that uncertainty has negative self-referential and behavioural 
implications (e.g., "Being uncertain means that I lack confidence" and "When it's time to 
act, uncertainty paralyses me"). The second factor of the IUS appeared to be based on 
beliefs relating to the idea that uncertainty is unfair and spoils everything (e.g., "It's 
unfair not having any guarantees in life" and "A small unforeseen event can spoil 
everything, even with the best of planning"). If intolerance of uncertainty is found to 
mediate symptom change during treatment, it would be of interest to establish whether 
the two factors of the IUS play an equally important role in bringing about this symptom 
change. 
The Current Study: Goals and Hypotheses 
Dugas and colleagues began a fifth clinical trial of the CBT protocol for GAD in 
2006. In this ongoing five-year study, participants with GAD receive CBT during 14 
weekly individual treatment sessions. During the treatment program, participants 
complete ratings of GAD symptoms on a daily basis from pre to posttreatment. 
Participants also complete symptom and cognitive variable measures on a periodic basis 
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throughout the treatment program (i.e., pre, mid, and posttreatment, as well as at 3 and 6 
months following treatment). All participants for the current analyses were recruited from 
this larger clinical trial. 
The nature of daily symptom change from pre to posttreatment. Our first goal was 
to examine the nature of symptom change during the pre-to-posttreatment interval of the 
CBT protocol and our analyses tested two hypotheses. First, we examined the mean rates 
of change in GAD-specific and associated symptoms (i.e., excessive worry, somatic 
anxiety, and depressive symptoms). The daily symptom ratings generated by participants 
during treatment assessed the percentage of each day they spent worrying, experiencing 
somatic anxiety, and experiencing feelings of depression (hereinafter referred to as "daily 
symptoms;" see Measures). Given that this CBT protocol had been shown to lead to 
significant decreases in GAD and associated symptoms in prior pre-to-posttreatment 
analyses, we hypothesized that it would also lead to significant mean decreases in the 
amount of time that participants spent worrying, experiencing somatic anxiety, and 
experiencing depressive symptoms on a daily basis during treatment (Hypothesis la). 
Our second hypothesis was related to the pattern of GAD-specific symptom 
changes that might be expected from pre to posttreatment (i.e., the interrelationships in 
the changes in daily ratings of worry and somatic anxiety). The results of the time-series 
analyses conducted by Dugas, Francis, and Bouchard (2009) suggested that the observed 
changes in GAD symptoms were bidirectional. However, this finding does not preclude 
the possibility that the bulk of symptom change occurs in a particular direction. In both 
the theoretical model developed by Dugas and colleagues (Dugas et al., 1998) and in 
current conceptualizations of GAD from a diagnostic point of view (e.g., Andrews et al., 
2010), excessive worry is understood to be the central feature of GAD. In the CBT 
protocol examined here, worry is explicitly targeted from the outset of treatment 
(whereas somatic anxiety is not) on the understanding that reductions in worry will 
nonetheless lead to subsequent reductions in somatic anxiety. Furthermore, there is 
evidence from experimental studies that when individuals reduce the time they spend 
worrying each day, they experience subsequent reductions in somatic complaints (e.g., 
muscle pain, dizziness) (Brosschot & van der Doef, 2006). As a result, we expected that 
the bulk of changes in GAD symptoms would occur in a particular direction. Specifically, 
we hypothesized that changes in daily ratings of worry would mediate change over time 
in daily ratings of somatic anxiety during treatment to a greater extent than the reverse 
mediational relationship (Hypothesis lb). 
Intolerance of uncertainty as a mechanism of GAD symptom change. Given the 
potential importance of intolerance of uncertainty in the maintenance (and reduction) of 
GAD symptoms, our second goal was to examine the extent to which changes in 
intolerance of uncertainty mediated GAD symptom change during the CBT program. For 
these analyses, we examined change in symptom and cognitive measures (i.e., WAQ and 
IUS, see Measures), which were administered periodically from pretreatment to six 
months following treatment. These analyses tested two hypotheses. First, we examined 
the mediational role of intolerance of uncertainty as assessed by the full-scale IUS. We 
hypothesized that change in intolerance of uncertainty would mediate change over time in 
GAD symptoms from pretreatment to six months following treatment (Hypothesis 2). 
Given that the two factors of the IUS appeared to represent different subsets of 
uncertainty-related beliefs, our second hypothesis regarding intolerance of uncertainty 
11 
related to the potential mediational role played by the IUS factors. In their factor 
analyses, Sexton and Dugas (2009) provided empirical support for the validity of the IUS 
factors. Both factors were found to be similarly and highly correlated with pathological 
worry. However, Factor 1 was more strongly related to GAD analogue status, trait 
anxiety, somatic anxiety, and depressive symptoms than Factor 2. Given these findings, 
we expected that Factor 1 might serve as a stronger mediator of GAD symptom change 
than Factor 2. In addition, it seemed likely that the beliefs represented by Factor 1 (e.g., 
"When it's time to act, uncertainty paralyses me") were more internally-oriented and 
might be more directly amenable to change via the hypothesis testing that participants 
engaged in during CBT. The beliefs associated with Factor 2, in contrast, appeared to be 
more externally-oriented, reflecting longer-standing assumptions about the consequences 
of uncertainty (e.g., "A small unforeseen event can spoil everything, even with the best of 
planning"). It therefore seemed that the treatment would be more likely to bring about 
changes in Factor 1 than Factor 2 beliefs and that we would be more likely to observe a 
mediation effect of Factor 1 on GAD symptom change. Consequently, we hypothesized 
that IUS Factor 1 would mediate GAD symptom change to a greater extent than would 
IUS Factor 2 from pretreatment to six months following treatment (Hypothesis J). 
Method 
Participants 
The sample for the current study (N = 51) consisted of 40 women and 11 men, all 
of whom had a primary diagnosis of GAD. The average age of participants was 44.57 
years (SD = 12.69) and they had completed an average of 16.04 years of education (SD = 
4.10). Of the 51 participants, 49.02% were employed full-time, 11.76% were employed 
part-time, 9.81% were full-time students, 1.96% were part-time students, and 27.45% 
were either not engaged in paid employment or were retired. The ethnic composition of 
the sample was as follows: 94.12% of participants identified as White/European, 3.92% 
as Middle Eastern, and 1.96% as Other. All participants were Francophone. 
GAD symptom severity was assessed at pretreatment using the 9-point (0-8) 
Clinician's Severity Rating scale of the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-
/F(ADIS-IV; Di Nardo, Brown, & Barlow, 1994). The mean GAD severity at 
pretreatment was 5.91 (SD = 0.75) and the mean duration of GAD was 11.30 years (SD 
12.66). When assessing comorbidity at pretreatment, 78.43% of the sample met 
diagnostic criteria for at least one other diagnosis, with 43.14% of the sample meeting 
criteria for one secondary condition, 29.41% meeting criteria for two secondary 
conditions, and 5.88% meeting criteria for three secondary conditions. Secondary 
conditions were panic disorder with or without agoraphobia (n = 14), specific phobia (n = 
14), major depressive disorder (n = 13), social anxiety disorder (n = 12), obsessive-
compulsive disorder (n = 5), posttraumatic stress disorder (n= 1), substance dependence 
(n= 1), and an eating disorder (n = 1). In terms of psychoactive medication, 50.98% were 
taking anxiolytic or antidepressant medication at intake. Finally, 35.29% of participants 
had previously received cognitive-behavioural treatment for an anxiety or mood disorder, 
and an additional 15.69% had received previous psychotherapy which included at least 
some cognitive-behavioural elements (see Table 1 for a summary of additional clinical 
characteristics in the current sample). 
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Procedure 
Participants were recruited from the Anxiety Disorders Clinic of the Hopital du 
Sacre-Coeur de Montreal, as part of a larger ongoing clinical trial of cognitive-
behavioural therapy for GAD (PI: Michel J. Dugas). To maximize the validity of initial 
diagnoses, each potential participant was interviewed by independent assessors using 
different structured diagnostic interviews. Initial assessments were conducted by a team 
psychiatrist using the Mini International Neuropsychiatry Interview, Version 5.0 (MINI; 
Sheehan et al., 1994). Individuals who met GAD diagnostic criteria on the MINI were 
then assessed by a team psychologist using the ADIS-IV (see Measures). At the end of 
each diagnostic interview, assessors rated the severity of each diagnosed condition on the 
9-point (0-8) Clinician's Severity Rating scale. The final severity rating for each disorder 
was determined by consensus during a team meeting with the Principal Investigator 
(M.J.D.). 
Inclusion criteria for the study were as follows: (a) a primary diagnosis of GAD 
with a score of at least 4/8 on the Clinician's Severity Rating scale, derived by consensus 
from the MINI and ADIS-IV initial interviews; (b) a difference of at least 1 point on the 
Clinician's Severity Rating scale between GAD and all secondary conditions; (c) 
between 18 and 64 years of age; (d) no change in medication type or dose 4 to 12 weeks 
prior to intake assessment (4 weeks for benzodiazepines and 12 weeks for antidepressants 
and hypnotics); (e) willingness to maintain a stable dose and type of psychoactive 
medication during treatment; (f) no evidence of suicidal intent; (g) no evidence of current 
substance abuse; and (h) no evidence of current or past schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, or 
organic mental disorder. 
A total of 73 individuals were assessed for eligibility for the clinical trial between 
March 2007 and January 2009. Of these individuals, 13 were excluded following the 
initial assessments because GAD was not diagnosed at intake (n = 8); GAD was not the 
primary diagnosis (n = 2); the severity of a secondary disorder was not sufficiently below 
the GAD severity rating on the Clinician's Severity Rating scale (n = 2); or another 
condition (i.e., attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder) appeared to be interfering with the 
completion of study measures (« = 1). An additional 7 participants withdrew their consent 
to participate after the initial assessment (n = 5) or after starting treatment (n = 2) due to 
difficulties meeting the time commitment for the study. Finally, two participants were 
excluded from the analyses due to difficulties completing the questionnaires (n= 1) or 
because of a change in psychoactive medication during treatment (n = 1). 
The remaining 51 participants received cognitive-behavioural therapy for GAD, 
based on the protocol developed by Dugas and colleagues (Dugas & Ladouceur, 2000). 
Treatment consisted of 14 individual weekly sessions with a clinical psychologist and 
included five treatment components. Participants first received (a) psychoeducation and 
worry awareness training, in which it was explained that by identifying and reducing 
worries, participants would experience a subsequent decrease in somatic anxiety. 
Participants also learned to monitor their GAD symptoms on a daily basis. In the second 
component, participants worked with their therapist to (b) re-evaluate the usefulness of 
worry, including challenging positive beliefs about worry (e.g., "If I worry I will be less 
disturbed when unforeseen events occur"). The next component consisted of (c) 
uncertainty recognition and behavioural exposure, in which the therapist explained the 
role of intolerance of uncertainty in maintaining worry and somatic anxiety. Participants 
also began to identify and enter into uncertainty-inducing situations, (d) Problem-solving 
training was then applied to help clients resolve current problems and to learn how 
intolerance of uncertainty can interfere with the problem solving process. Finally, (e) 
participants learned to use repeated imaginal exposure for worries about hypothetical 
situations, exposing themselves to the imaginal scenarios until they no longer 
experienced anxiety (see Dugas & Robichaud, 2007, for a detailed description of the 
protocol). 
In addition to the initial structured diagnostic interviews, diagnostic assessments 
using the ADIS-IV were administered at posttreatment, and at 3 and 6-month follow-up. 
Participants also completed a battery of self-report questionnaires at pre, mid, and 
posttreatment, as well as at 3 and 6 months following treatment, and these batteries 
included several measures of GAD and associated symptoms (see Measures). Finally, 
therapists provided participants with a daily self-monitoring booklet during the first 
treatment session. In this booklet, participants indicated on a 0-100% scale the percentage 
of each day that they spent worrying, experiencing somatic anxiety, and experiencing 
feelings of depression during treatment. Participants also used this booklet to monitor 
their daily use of psychoactive medication. However, the use of medication was not part 
of the present analyses and only the daily symptom ratings are discussed here. 
In order to enhance the validity of the daily symptom ratings, clinicians gave their 
clients a simple definition of each symptom in the first treatment session. Worry was 
defined as "a chain of upsetting thoughts about something bad that could happen to you 
or to others." Somatic anxiety was defined as "a physiological reaction that includes 
responses such as muscle tension, restlessness, and feeling keyed up or on edge." 
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Depression was defined as "a feeling of sadness, depression, or low mood." Although the 
somatic symptoms of GAD also include fatigue, difficulties concentrating, irritability, 
and sleep disturbance (DSM-IV-TR, 2000), these symptoms were excluded from the 
present definition of somatic anxiety because they are not specific to GAD (see Andrews 
et al., 2010). 
Measures 
Diagnostic interviews. The Mini International Neuropsychiatry Interview, 
Version 5.0 (MINI; Sheehan et al., 1994) is a brief and structured diagnostic interview 
that assesses mood and anxiety disorders, substance use disorders, psychotic disorders, 
eating disorders, and suicidal risk. The MINI was designed for use in clinical settings and 
assesses the presence of current psychological problems. Clients provide yes/no answers 
to screening questions for each disorder. The MINI was designed to be used by a broad 
range of clinicians, including general medical practitioners, and has adequate 
psychometric properties (Sheehan et al., 1997). The 9-point Clinician's Severity Rating 
scale from the ADIS-IV (see below) was used to obtain severity ratings for MINI 
diagnoses. 
The Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV (ADIS-IV; Di Nardo et al., 
1994) assesses anxiety disorders and screens for other Axis I conditions, including mood 
and somatoform disorders, substance use and psychotic disorders, and medical problems. 
The severity of Axis I disorders is assessed using the Clinician's Severity Rating scale 
which ranges from 0 (Absent or none) to 8 (Very severe or very severely 
disturbing/disabling). A score of 4 (Moderate or definitely disturbing/disabling) indicates 
a clinically significant level of symptom severity. The ADIS-IV has been found to have 
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good to excellent interrater reliability for anxiety disorders (K = .67 to .86) (Brown, Di 
Nardo, Lehman, & Campbell, 2001). 
Symptom measures. The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, 
Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990) is a 16-item self-report measure of the tendency to engage 
in excessive and uncontrollable worry. The measure was designed to assess the intensity 
and excessiveness of worry regardless of the specific worry content (e.g., "I'm always 
worrying about something"). Items are rated on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 
(Not at all typical of me) to 5 (Very typical of me). The PSWQ has high internal 
consistency (a = .86 to .95) and good 4-week test-retest reliability (r = .74 to .93) (Molina 
& Borkovec, 1994). The internal reliability for the PSWQ in the current sample was a = 
.83. 
The Worry and Anxiety Questionnaire (WAQ; Dugas et al., 2001) is an 11-item 
self-report measure that assesses the presence and severity of GAD symptoms according 
to the DSM-IV diagnostic criteria. Overall, the WAQ has been found to have satisfactory 
test-retest reliability and diagnostic validity (i.e., it can be used to distinguish between 
individuals who do and do not meet GAD diagnostic criteria) (Dugas et al., 2001). The 
WAQ contains a subscale that assesses the six somatic symptoms associated with GAD 
(e.g., restlessness, muscle tension, fatigue, irritability, difficulties concentrating and 
difficulties sleeping), as well as questions regarding the frequency, intensity, and 
uncontrollability of worry. Items are rated on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (Not 
at all) to 5 (Very severe). The internal reliability for the WAQ in the current sample was 
a = .65. 
The Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) is a self-
report measure that assesses the severity of depressive symptoms (e.g., sadness, 
pessimism, and loss of interest) over the previous two weeks. The measure contains 21 
groups of 4 items that reflect different degrees of depressive symptoms. Scores range 
from 0 to 3 on a Likert scale. The BDI-II has excellent internal consistency (a = .92) and 
test-retest reliability over a 1-week period (r = .93) (Beck et al., 1996). The internal 
reliability for the BDI-II in the current sample was a - .90. 
The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-Trait version (STAI-T; Spielberger, 1977) is a 
20-item self-report measure used to assess the degree to which individuals have the stable 
tendency to experience anxiety (e.g., "I feel nervous and restless"). Items are rated on a 
4-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (Almost never) to 4 (Almost always). The internal 
consistency has been found to be high (a = .89) in a sample of individuals diagnosed with 
a variety of anxiety disorders, and the measure has been found to correlate highly with 
other commonly-used measures of anxiety (e.g., The Beck Anxiety Inventory-, Beck & 
Steer, 1990) and depressive symptoms (e.g., The Beck Depression Inventory; Beck, Rush, 
Shaw, & Emery, 1979). The internal reliability of the STAI-T was a = .84 in the present 
sample. 
The Daily Self-Monitoring Booklet is a 4-page booklet used to record daily 
symptom levels and psychoactive medication use during treatment. To assess symptoms, 
participants use a 0-100% scale to record the percentage of each day spent experiencing 
worry, somatic anxiety, and feelings of sadness or depression (e.g., "what proportion of 
the day did you spend worrying?"). This booklet is similar to those used in previous 
clinical trials (e.g., Dugas & Ladouceur, 2000; Gosselin et al., 2006) and comparable 
daily ratings of worry have been shown to correlate significantly with scores on other 
well-established and valid measures of worry. Verkuil, Brosschot, and Thayer (2001) 
found, for example, that scores on the PSWQ were moderately correlated with the 
frequency of daily worries reported for a non-clinical sample during a 1-week period (r = 
.44, p < .01). Other researchers have found that PSWQ scores correlate moderately with 
daily ratings of the amount of time spent worrying over a 2-week period among both non-
clinical participants (r = .59, p < .01) and individuals with GAD (r = .42, p < .01) 
(Dupuy, Beaudoin, Rheaume, Ladouceur, & Dugas, 2001). 
Cognitive process measure. The Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS; Freeston 
et al., 1994) is a 27-item scale that assesses negative beliefs about uncertainty. Scores on 
the IUS can range from 27 to 135, with higher scores indicating higher levels of 
intolerance of uncertainty. Recent and large factor analyses (N = 2,451) conducted by 
Sexton and Dugas (2009) have shown that the IUS has a two-factor structure. Factor 1 
represents the belief that uncertainty has negative behavioural and self-referential 
implications and Factor 2 represents the belief that uncertainty is unfair and spoils 
everything. The IUS has been shown to have excellent internal consistency (a = .94), and 
good test-retest reliability when assessed over a 5-week period (Buhr & Dugas, 2002). In 
the current sample, the internal reliability of the full-scale IUS was a = .97. The internal 
reliability scores for Factor 1 and Factor 2 were a -.91 and a = .94 respectively. The two 
subscales were highly correlated with each other (r = .86,/? < .01) and with the full-scale 
IUS (r = .97 and r = .96 respectively with p < .001). 
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Data Analysis Strategy 
Coinciding with the recent increased interest in treatment process research, there 
has been a corresponding interest in data analytic strategies that allow researchers to 
model change over time in a continuous rather than a cross-sectional manner 
(Gueorguieva & Krystal, 2004; Willett, Singer, & Martin, 1998). Multilevel statistical 
modeling is a data analysis strategy that is becoming increasingly popular in studies 
involving longitudinal research designs (Kenny, Korchmaros, & Bolger, 2003; Krull & 
MacKinnon, 1999). In this approach, it is assumed that there are at least two levels in a 
data set. In the case of repeated measures designs, the lower level, or Level 1, consists of 
repeated measures of a variable of interest. Units at Level 1 are said to be nested within 
Level 2 units, or individuals. Multilevel modeling has several advantages over more 
traditional data analysis strategies. This strategy can, for example, effectively manage 
missing data in repeated measures, which is a common problem in longitudinal research. 
Multilevel models can also take into account (and adjust for) bias in standard errors and 
statistical tests that might result from the non-independence of observations nested within 
individuals (Gueorguieva & Krystal, 2004; Krull & MacKinnon, 1999; Raudenbush & 
Bryk, 2002). 
The data in the current study were longitudinal, with each participant providing 
two types of repeated symptom measures, including daily symptom ratings during 
treatment and periodic symptom and cognitive measures at pre, mid, and posttreatment, 
as well as at 3 and 6 months following treatment. Given that the longitudinal nature of the 
study produced a multilevel or nested data structure, with repeated measures nested 
within individuals, all main analyses were carried out using Hierarchical Linear 
Modeling, which is a computer software program that can be used to conduct multilevel 
statistical modelling (HLM 6.06; Raudenbush, Bryk, & Congdon, 2006). 
The nature of daily symptom change from pre to posttreatment. To determine the 
mean rate of change in GAD and associated symptoms (i.e., worry, somatic anxiety, and 
depressive symptoms) from pre to posttreatment, we calculated a series of lower-level 
growth curve models representing change over time in the daily symptom ratings that 
participants completed between their first and final treatment sessions. In each model, the 
repeated symptom measures were predicted by time at level 1 of the analysis (with 
number of days from the start of treatment as the indicator of time). Following 
recommendations by Willett, Singer, and Martin (1998), we initially used power 
polynomials to test whether change over time in daily symptoms was best represented by 
a linear time function (i.e., time coded as 0, 1, 2...) or a quadratic time function (i.e., time 
coded as 02, l2, 22...). 
We then examined the patterns of change in daily ratings of GAD-specific 
symptoms (i.e., worry and somatic anxiety) from pre to posttreatment. A series of lower-
level mediation models (Kenny, Korchmaros, & Bolger, 2003) were computed to 
determine whether changes in worry mediated changes in somatic anxiety during 
treatment to a greater extent than the reverse mediational relationship. Time was again 
used as the initial predictor variable. Two mediation models were tested (see Figure 1). 
Model la consisted of time predicting somatic anxiety, with worry as the mediator. This 
model was the hypothesized model for the treatment protocol, in which changes in worry 
were expected to mediate change over time in somatic anxiety to a greater extent than the 
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reverse. Model lb tested the reverse mediation relationship and consisted of time 
predicting worry, with somatic anxiety as the mediator. 
Because these and all subsequent main analyses involved tin exploration of 
mediation effects, several general comments should be made here about the methods we 
used to assess mediation. Our approach to mediation analysis was derived from Baron 
and Kenny (1986) and adapted to a multilevel context by Kenny, Korchmaros, and 
Bolger (2003). Conceptually, demonstrating that mediation has occurred involves 
establishing that a mediating variable partially or fully accounts for the relation between 
an initial predictor and an outcome variable. Three regression equations are computed. In 
the first equation, the total effect of the initial predictor (i.e., time) on the outcome is 
estimated (i.e., the c paths depicted in Figure 1). Two mediational equations are then 
computed, including estimates of the effect of the initial predictor on the mediator (i.e., 
the a paths in Figure 1), and the effect of the initial predictor on the outcome when the 
effect of the mediator is added to the final regression model (i.e., the c' and b paths, 
respectively). 
Traditional tests of mediation effects have relied on quantifying the reduction in 
the total effect of the initial predictor on the outcome once the mediator is included in the 
model (i.e., the reduction from c to c *). However, to test for the presence of mediation 
effects in the current study, we used two statistical methods that assess the magnitude of 
the indirect effects directly (i.e., the product of the a and b paths). Specifically, we 
conducted the Aroian version of the Sobel test (Baron & Kenny, 1986) for each indirect 
effect, which is recommended for lower level fully-random mediation analyses because it 
allows for the possibility that the components of the indirect effects co-vary across 
individuals. However, although the Sobel test is widely-recognized, it has also been 
found to be conservative in small samples (Krull & MacKinnon, 1999). As a result, we 
also used a test of the distribution of the ab products in each model which is a more 
powerful test of mediation (Fritz & MacKinnon, 2007). To do so, we constructed the 
95% confidence intervals around each ab product using a statistical software program, 
Product Confidence Limits for Indirect Effects (PRODCLIN; MacKinnon, Fritz, 
Williams, & Lockwood, 2007). Because the distribution of ab products tends to be 
asymmetrical (MacKinnon et al., 2007), PRODCLIN produces asymmetric confidence 
limits, consistent with the non-normal distribution of indirect effects. Finally, we also 
wished to compare the magnitude of mediation effects across mediation models. As a 
result, we also computed the percentage of mediation for each model, which is the 
proportion of the total effect of the initial predictor on the outcome that is accounted for 
by the mediator (Shrout & Bolger, 2002). 
The type of mediation analysis described here has allowed process researchers to 
identify the interrelationships between changes in variables over time (e.g., Hofinann et 
al., 2007; Moscovitch, Hofinann, Suvak, & In-Albon, 2005; Smits, Rosenfield, 
McDonald, & Telch, 2006). However, statements regarding mediation presume both a 
particular statistical relationship between the mediator and outcome variable as well as a 
temporal one. In order to establish that mediation has occurred, the mediating variable 
must be shown to temporally precede the outcome variable (Baron & Kenny, 1986). To 
date, most analyses examining mediation have relied on estimates of mediator and 
outcome variables that were assessed at the same point in time (e.g., Hofmann et al., 
2007; Moscovitch et al., 2005). As a result, researchers typically conduct follow-up 
analyses in which a temporal lag is created between the mediator and outcome variables 
to determine the temporal precedence of observed changes (e.g., Meuret, Rosenfield, 
Hofmann, Suvak, & Roth, 2009; Smits, Rosenfield, McDonald, & Telch, 2006). 
Newer methods of testing mediation are beginning to incorporate a temporal lag 
directly into mediation analyses in a variety of ways (MacKinnon, 2008). As a result, in 
these and all subsequent mediation analyses, we chose to incorporate this temporal 
relationship by creating a time lag between mediating and outcome variables such that 
scores for each mediating variable preceded scores for each outcome variable by one 
assessment point.1 For instance, in the mediation models examining the patterns of 
change in daily symptom ratings, the a paths depicted in Figure 1 represent change over 
time in the mediating variable from the first day of treatment to the second-to-last day of 
treatment. In contrast, the c and c ' paths represent change in the outcome variable from 
the second day of treatment to the final day of treatment (i.e., there is a lag of one day 
between mediator and outcome variables). 
Intolerance of uncertainty as a mechanism of GAD symptom change. To 
determine whether changes in intolerance of uncertainty served as a mechanism of 
symptom change, we examined the effect of intolerance of uncertainty on GAD 
symptoms assessed at pre, mid, and posttreatment, and at 3 and 6-month follow-up. We 
again computed lower-level mediation models (see Figure 2). We began by examining 
the mediational role of the full-scale IUS (see Measures) on GAD symptom change. Two 
mediation models were tested using a procedure similar to the one described for the daily 
symptom ratings. Model 2a consisted of time predicting GAD symptoms (i.e., WAQ 
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scores), with intolerance of uncertainty (i.e., IUS full-scale scores) as the mediator. This 
was the hypothesized model for the full-scale IUS. 
Model 2b (see Figure 2) tested the reverse mediation relationship and consisted of 
time predicting intolerance of uncertainty (i.e., IUS full-scale scores), with GAD 
symptom scores as the mediator (i.e., WAQ scores). A time lag was again created 
between mediating and outcome variables. Specifically, scores on the mediator (e.g., full-
scale IUS scores in Model 2a) preceded scores on the outcome variable (e.g., WAQ 
scores) by one assessment point. Thus, in the mediation models depicted in Figure 2, the 
paths representing change over time in each mediator (i.e., the a paths) represent change 
over time in the mediator from pretreatment to 3-month follow-up. In contrast, change 
over time in the outcome variable in each model (i.e., the c and c' paths) represents 
change from mid-treatment to 6-month follow-up. To examine the role of the IUS factors 
in GAD symptom change, these mediation models were computed again with each of the 
IUS factors as potential mediators (see Models 3a to 3d in Figure 2). 
Results 
Participant Selection for the Current Sample 
The goal in this study was to examine some of the potentially important processes 
of change during CBT. Because of the preliminary nature of these analyses (i.e., this was 
the first attempt at formally establishing intolerance of uncertainty as a mediator and the 
data represent only a portion of the full sample that will eventually be obtained), we 
included only individuals who had completed the treatment portion of the CBT program 
and the 6-month follow-up period in the present sample. Individuals who drop out of 
treatment may differ in important ways from those who complete treatment and although 
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an analysis of the change processes among individuals who drop out of treatment is an 
important next step, we wished to first establish the rate and mechanism of symptom 
change that can be expected for those who completed the treatment program. 
Interrater Agreement on Diagnostic Status 
We assessed the degree of interrater agreement on GAD diagnoses at pretreatment 
in two ways. First, we calculated the percentage of agreement between the MINI and 
ADIS interviews for GAD diagnoses in the total sample of individuals who were initially 
assessed for the treatment study (N = 73). Agreement between assessors was met when 
they agreed on both the presence of GAD and the severity of GAD symptoms (i.e., scores 
on the Clinician's Severity Rating scale were equal to 4 or above on the 9-point scale and 
there was a difference of no more than one point in severity between assessors' ratings). 
The percentage of agreement for the assessed sample was 68.50%. We then calculated 
the interrater agreement on GAD symptom severity for the sample of individuals who 
were included in the present study (N = 51), all of whom met diagnostic criteria for 
primary GAD. Scores on both the MINI and ADIS had to be within one point of each 
other on the Clinician's Severity Rating scale for assessors to be considered in agreement. 
The percentage of agreement for GAD severity ratings in the treated sample was 89.04%. 
The Nature of Daily Symptom Change from Pre to Posttreatment 
Preliminary analyses. The current treatment protocol was designed to be 
administered over approximately 14 weekly individual treatment sessions and 
participants were asked to complete ratings of the time spent worrying, experiencing 
somatic anxiety, and experiencing feelings of depression on a daily basis from the first to 
the last treatment session. The mean number of treatment sessions completed by 
participants was 14.63 (SD = 1.37), although the number of sessions that participants 
actually received ranged from 11 to 18 sessions. The expected number of ratings per 
person was approximately 91 daily ratings over the 13-week treatment period. However, 
given variability in scheduling weekly sessions, participants actually completed an 
average of 110.77 (SD = 21.74) daily ratings. There was also considerable variability in 
the number of ratings completed during treatment, ranging from 73 to 192 ratings. 
To assess participants' daily symptom ratings at the start of treatment, we 
calculated the mean percentage of each symptom for the first week of the treatment 
program. On average, participants spent 35.19% (SD = 16.86) of each day worrying, 
34.04% (SD = 17.63) of each day experiencing somatic anxiety, and 15.19% (SD = 
13.76) of each day experiencing feelings of depression during the first week of treatment. 
Thus, although participants were spending an equal amount of time worrying and 
experiencing somatic symptoms, they were experiencing feelings of depression for a 
smaller proportion of the day at the start of treatment. 
Mean rates of symptom change. Before examining mean rates of change in daily 
symptom ratings during treatment, we first examined the raw daily ratings obtained from 
the sample. As shown in Figure 3, considerable fluctuations were observed throughout 
the treatment program. Although this appeared to be true for most participants, there also 
appeared at first glance to be a dramatic increase in the amount of time participants spent 
worrying, experiencing somatic anxiety, and experiencing depressive symptoms towards 
the end of treatment. However, it should be noted here that only a few participants 
provided a considerably larger number of daily symptom ratings than the majority of 
individuals in the sample. In particular, five of the 51 participants in the sample provided 
more than 135 daily symptom ratings. Of these individuals, only one participant actually 
showed a substantial increase in symptom ratings during the final days of treatment. The 
other four participants experienced either small decreases or no change in symptoms over 
treatment. However, these participants began and continued to experience high levels of 
daily symptom ratings relative to other participants throughout the treatment program. In 
fact, it was for this reason that these participants were offered additional treatment 
sessions. In Figure 3, the cumulative effect of these participants, who made up only 
9.80% of the total sample, was the apparent dramatic increase in daily symptom severity 
at the end of treatment. Nonetheless, the analyses described below were conducted both 
with and without these individuals. Their removal had little effect on the parameters that 
were estimated. As a result, their daily ratings were included in these analyses to maintain 
the representativeness of the sample data. 
We then calculated a series of lower-level growth curve models to determine the 
mean rate of change in daily symptoms, with each of the daily symptom measures 
predicted by time at level 1 of the analyses. Time was coded as both a linear and a 
quadratic function in each regression model. In order to assess the relative amount of 
within-person variance accounted for by each time variable, these variables were entered 
into each regression model in a hierarchical manner. Consistent with our first hypothesis 
(Hypothesis la), we found that there was a significant decrease in the daily ratings of 
time spent worrying (B = -0.15,/? < .001), experiencing somatic anxiety (B = -0.15,p < 
.001), and experiencing feelings of depression (B - -0.07,/? < .001) during the treatment 
program (see Table 2). We also found that nonlinear change accounted for a significant 
proportion of within-person variance above and beyond the effect of linear time on 
ratings of worry and somatic anxiety, but not for ratings of depression. However, the 
additional amount of variance accounted for by nonlinear time was small for each daily 
symptom measure (i.e., accounting for only an additional 4.68%, 4.07%, and 3.47% of 
the within-person variance in ratings of worry, somatic anxiety, and feelings of 
depression respectively). As a result, we used linear time as a predictor in all subsequent 
analyses involving the daily symptom ratings. 
When examining the linear rates of change for each daily symptom rating, we 
found that participants experienced an average decrease of approximately 0.15 of a 
percentage point per day in time spent worrying and experiencing somatic anxiety, which 
translated into a decrease of approximately 13.65% on the 0-100% scale over 91 days of 
treatment. Participants experienced a decrease of only 0.07 of a percentage point per day 
on average in time spent feeling depressed during treatment (or a decrease of 
approximately 6.37% on the 0-100% scale). 
Patterns of symptom change. We examined the patterns of change in daily ratings 
of GAD-specific symptoms (i.e., worry and somatic anxiety) from pre to posttreatment. 
For this analysis, two lower-level mediation models were computed to determine whether 
changes in worry mediated changes in somatic anxiety during treatment, and/or whether 
the reverse was true (see Figure 1). Linear time was the initial predictor variable in each 
model. Model la consisted of time predicting somatic anxiety, with worry as the 
mediator and this was the hypothesized model for the CBT program (Hypothesis lb). 
Model lb tested the reverse mediation relationship. A time lag of one day was introduced 
between mediating and outcome variables in each model (see Data Analysis Strategy), so 
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that the temporal relationship between changes in each variable could be directly 
assessed. 
The results from the two mediation analyses are presented in Table 3. In Model 
la, there was a significant direct effect of time on somatic anxiety (B = -0.15, p < .001). 
However, when worry was entered as the mediator, the magnitude of the direct effect of 
time on somatic anxiety was reduced (B = -0.08, p < .001) and the indirect effect was 
significant (Sobel test statistic = -6.99,p < .001). In Model lb, there was a significant 
direct effect of time on worry (B = -0.15,/? < .001). However, with somatic anxiety 
entered as the mediator, the direct effect of time on worry was also reduced (B = -0.10,/? 
< .001) and this indirect effect was also significant (Sobel test statistic = -6.24, p < .001). 
We then calculated the percentage of mediation for each model and found that the 
percentage of mediation was greater in the expected direction. Changes in worry 
mediated (and accounted for 47.67% of) changes in somatic anxiety, whereas changes in 
somatic anxiety mediated (and accounted for 36.40%) of changes in worry. 
Intolerance of Uncertainty as a Mechanism of GAD Symptom Change 
Preliminary analyses. Before examining whether changes in intolerance of 
uncertainty mediated change over time in GAD symptoms, we computed lower-level 
growth curve models to assess the mean rates of change from pretreatment to 6-month 
follow-up. In these and all subsequent analyses, GAD symptoms were assessed using the 
Worry and Anxiety Questionnaire (WAQ) and intolerance of uncertainty was assessed 
using the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS). It should also be noted here that 
because the two-factor structure of the IUS had not yet been confirmed in a clinical 
sample, we first conducted a preliminary confirmatory factor analysis in a sample of 
individuals with GAD (N= 271) before proceeding with the mediation analyses described 
below. The results of this confirmatory factor analysis provided support for the two IUS 
factors originally identified by Sexton and Dugas (2009). A summary of the findings are 
presented in Table 6 and a more detailed description of the analysis is presented in 
Appendix A. 
An initial examination of the nature of change in intolerance of uncertainty and 
GAD symptoms from pretreatment to 6-month follow-up suggested that this change was 
likely not linear (see Figure 4). As a result, we began by including both linear and 
quadratic time variables as initial predictors when assessing mean rates of change. The 
mean rates of change in GAD symptoms, intolerance of uncertainty, and in its two factors 
are presented in Table 4. In order to determine the proportion of within-person variance 
accounted for by each time variable, the linear and quadratic time functions were again 
added to each model in a hierarchical manner. On average, significant mean linear 
decreases were observed in each variable of interest from pretreatment to 6-month 
follow-up. However, non-linear time accounted for a significant amount of within-person 
variability in each variable above and beyond the effect of linear time. Thus, on average, 
participants not only showed mean decreases in GAD symptoms and intolerance of 
uncertainty (and its factors), but also a significant degree of deceleration in this change 
from pretreatment to 6-month follow-up. An inspection of the graphs presented in Figure 
4 suggested that this deceleration likely occurred during the 3 to 6-month follow-up 
period. 
In terms of the rate of change in each variable, a significant mean linear decrease 
was found on the WAQ (B = -2.14, p < .001), with linear time accounting for 65.30% of 
the within-person variance from pretreatment to 6-month follow-up. Nonlinear time only 
accounted for an additional 6.01% of the total within-person variance in WAQ scores. 
The mean linear decrease in the full-scale IUS was also significant (B = -5.04,/? < .001), 
with linear time accounting for 47.58% of the within-person variance in IUS scores, and 
nonlinear time accounting for an additional 17.32%. Significant mean linear decreases 
were also observed in both IUS factors (Factor 1 :5 = -2.42, /? < .001; Factor 2: B = -2.63, 
/? < .001) from pretreatment to 6-month follow-up. Non-linear time accounted for an 
additional 13.28% of the within-person variance in IUS Factor 1 and an additional 
18.97% of the within-person variance in IUS Factor 2. 
The graphs in Figure 4 also suggested that the rate of change in Factor 2 might 
have been greater during the interval from pre to midtreatment than the rate of change in 
Factor 1. In fact, when we conducted paired-samples t tests on the two factors, we found 
that while the mean difference in Factor 2 scores from pre to midtreatment was 
statistically significant (Factor 2 Mean Differencepre_mid = 5.35, /(50) = 4.30,/? < .001), the 
difference in Factor 1 scores was not (Factor 1 Mean Differencep r e .m jd = 12.77, t(50) = 
1.74, /? = .09). In contrast, the mean differences within each factor between mid and 
posttreatment were both statistically significant (Factor 1 Mean Differencemjd-post= 5.72, 
t(50) = 4.80,/? < .001; Factor 2 Mean Differencemid-post= 4.64, f(50) = 5.39,/? < .001). 
The full-scale IUS as a mechanism of GAD symptom change. We next examined 
whether change over time on the full-scale IUS mediated change over time in GAD 
symptoms from pretreatment to 6-month follow-up. Two lower-level mediation models 
were computed (see Figure 2). Although the initial regression analyses described above 
suggested that mean changes over time on all variables of interest were non-linear, a 
linear time function nonetheless accounted for the greatest proportion of within-person 
variance in each variable. A linear time function is also more straightforward to interpret 
in the context of mediation analyses. As a result, we chose to conduct these analyses 
using linear time as the initial predictor. 
The results from all IUS mediation analyses are presented in Table 5. Models 2a 
and 2b describe the mediation analyses conducted with the full-scale IUS and WAQ. Our 
expectation was that change over time on the full-scale IUS would mediate change over 
time on the WAQ (Hypothesis 2). As can be seen in Table 5, change over time on the 
full-scale IUS was found to partially mediate change over time on the WAQ (Sobel test 
statistic = -4.28,/? < .001) from pretreatment to 6-month follow-up. The percentage of 
mediation indicated that the indirect effect of the full-scale IUS accounted for 23.13% of 
the total effect of time on the WAQ. However, we also found that the reverse mediation 
relationship was also statistically significant. In other words, change over time on the 
WAQ was also found to mediate change over time on the full-scale IUS (Sobel test 
statistic = -4.13,/? < .001), and the percentage of mediation in this model was 73.22%. 
Thus, these first analyses suggested that it was primarily change in GAD symptoms 
which mediated change over time in intolerance of uncertainty. 
The IUS factors as mechanisms of GAD symptom change. We next examined the 
role of IUS Factor 1 in GAD symptom reduction (i.e., Models 3a and 3b in Figure 2). Our 
expectation was that change over time in IUS Factor 1 would mediate change over time 
on the WAQ to a greater extent than would IUS Factor 2 (Hypothesis 3). However, 
although change in IUS Factor 1 was indeed found to mediate change over time on the 
WAQ (i.e., Model 3a; Sobel test statistic = -3.26 ,p < .001), the percentage of mediation 
for Model 3a was only 15.87% (see Table 5). Model 3b describes the reverse mediation 
effect (i.e., change in GAD symptoms mediating change in IUS Factor 1), which was also 
found to be statistically significant (Sobel test statistic = -5.46, p < .001). The percentage 
of mediation for Model 3b was 96.78%. Thus, an examination of the mediating effects of 
both the full-scale IUS and IUS Factor 1 suggested that change in intolerance of 
uncertainty was not a strong mediator of GAD symptom change. More specifically, 
Factor 1 appeared to be a relatively weak mediator of symptom change, and instead was 
almost fully mediated by change in GAD symptoms. 
When we examined the role of IUS Factor 2 on change over time on the WAQ, 
however, we found a different pattern. As shown in Model 3c, change over time in Factor 
2 of the IUS partially mediated change over time on the WAQ from pretreatment to 6-
month follow-up (Sobel test statistic = -4.87,p < .001) and the percentage of mediation in 
this model was 37.15%. Model 3d examined the reverse mediation effect and it was 
found that change on the WAQ also partially mediated change over time on IUS Factor 2 
(Sobel test statistic = -1.94,/? = .053; 95% CI for ab = -0.71[-1.46, -0.01]). The 
percentage of mediation for this final model was 38.22%. 
Discussion 
The goal of the present study was to examine the processes of symptom change 
during an efficacious CBT program designed specifically for GAD. We began our 
analyses by examining the rate and patterns of symptom change during the 14-session 
CBT program developed by Dugas and colleagues. Our first hypothesis (.Hypothesis la) 
was that, consistent with past clinical trials of this CBT protocol, we would observe 
significant symptom decreases from pre to posttreatment in daily ratings of worry, 
somatic anxiety, and depressive symptoms. This hypothesis was confirmed. On average, 
participants experienced significant decreases in the amount of time they spent worrying 
and experiencing somatic anxiety from pre to posttreatment. In fact, in the first week of 
treatment, participants were spending an average of 34.04% to 35.19% of each day 
worrying and feeling anxious (i.e., 5.12 to 5.23 hours, respectively, in a 15-hour day). An 
average decrease of 13.64% was observed during treatment, suggesting that participants 
were experiencing GAD symptoms for only 3.06 to 3.23 hours in a 15-hour day on 
average by the end of the 14-session treatment program. 
Although participants were only experiencing feelings of depression for 15.19% 
of each day on average at the start of treatment, they nonetheless also showed a 
significant mean reduction of 6.37% during treatment (i.e., a reduction from 2.28 to 1.32 
hours in a 15-hour day). Thus, although participants were not asymptomatic by the end of 
treatment, they nonetheless experienced observable decreases in both GAD and 
associated symptoms. These changes are encouraging, particularly given that the 
treatment protocol primarily targets worry, without explicit attempts to decrease either 
somatic anxiety or depressive symptoms. 
Our next analyses examined the patterns of symptom change in daily ratings of 
GAD symptoms during treatment (i.e., worry and somatic anxiety). Given that worry is 
understood as the central feature of GAD (Andrews et al., 2010; DSM-IV-TR, 2000), and 
given that this CBT protocol targets worry (but not somatic anxiety) explicitly, we 
expected that changes in worry would mediate changes in somatic anxiety from pre to 
posttreatment to a greater extent than the reverse mediational relationship (Hypothesis 
lb). This hypothesis was also confirmed. Changes in the amount of time that participants 
spent worrying partially mediated changes in the amount of time spent experiencing 
somatic anxiety. The reverse mediational relationship was also found, in which changes 
in time spent experiencing somatic anxiety also partially mediated changes in the amount 
of time participants spent worrying. However, although the percentage of mediation was 
greater in the expected direction (47.67% vs. 36.40%), the difference in the magnitude of 
cach indirect effect was only 11.27%. As a result, it may be more meaningful from a 
clinical point of view to consider this relationship as essentially bidirectional. 
Although unexpected, the bidirectional nature of GAD symptom change, even in 
a treatment that targets only worry explicitly, makes sense given current assumptions that 
anxiety disorders consist of interacting cognitive, physiological, affective, and 
behavioural sets of symptoms, and that changes in one set of symptoms may result in 
changes in another (e.g., Beck & Clark, 1997). In terms of why changes in worry might 
lead to subsequent change in anxiety, some researchers have suggested that the process of 
worrying may prolong physiological stress responses to a particular stressor, even beyond 
the actual presence of that stressor (Brosschot, Gerin, & Thayer, 2006). It seems possible, 
given our findings, that this process might actually work in both directions and, in fact, 
the typical relationship between changes in worry and somatic anxiety during treatment 
may be cyclical in nature. If this is the case, it may be that this cyclicality is in fact the 
typical pattern of symptom change and it may be clinically meaningful in the future to 
identify participants for whom this cyclicality does not occur. Future research is needed 
to determine whether different patterns of symptom change than those presented here can 
be used by clinicians as a guide to the efficacy of CBT for individual clients. 
The finding that the CBT protocol examined here leads to reductions in both 
worry and somatic anxiety is encouraging in light of current theories of information 
processing. It appears, for instance, that individuals with high levels of both worry and 
anxiety have greater difficulty disengaging their attention from threat-related stimuli 
(e.g., angry faces) than individuals who experience high levels of worry or anxiety alone 
(Verkuil, Brosschot, Putman, & Thayer, 2009). Thus, clinicians may take heart in the 
fact that focusing on one set of symptoms for GAD may result in positive and pervasive 
changes in the way individuals with GAD process information. It should also be noted, 
however, that the effects of mediation in the analyses in the current study were not 
complete in either direction, and it may be that during treatment changes in each GAD 
symptom are also brought about by changes in other phenomena (e.g., changes in 
symptoms of depression). 
In our next analyses, we wished to determine whether changes in a theoretically-
relevant cognitive variable, intolerance of uncertainty, served as a mechanism of GAD 
symptom change during the CBT program. In addition, we wished to examine the role 
that specific beliefs about uncertainty played in symptom reduction during treatment. To 
this end, we first examined the factor structure of the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale 
(IUS) by conducting a confirmatory factor analysis of the IUS in a Francophone clinical 
sample (N= 271). This analysis allowed us to confirm the two-factor structure identified 
previously by Sexton and Dugas (2009) (see Table 6). Specifically, Factor 1 appeared to 
be represented by beliefs that are consistent with the idea that uncertainty has negative 
self-referential and behavioural implications (e.g., "Being uncertain means that I lack 
confidence" and "When it's time to act, uncertainty paralyses me"). Factor 2 appeared to 
be represented by beliefs regarding the fact that uncertainty is unfair and spoils 
everything (e.g., "It's unfair not having any guarantees in life" and "A small unforeseen 
event can spoil everything, even with the best of planning"). Thus, in addition to 
examining the role that intolerance of uncertainty plays generally in GAD symptom 
change, we were able to examine the role played by two distinct sets of beliefs about 
uncertainty. 
Given that previous research had demonstrated a close relationship between full-
scale scores on the IUS and both excessive worry and GAD diagnostic status (e.g., Buhr 
& Dugas, 2002; Ladouceur, Gosselin, & Dugas, 2000), we expected that changes in 
intolerance of uncertainty, as assessed by the full-scale IUS, would mediate GAD 
symptom change during the CBT program (i.e., from pretreatment to 6 months following 
treatment) (.Hypothesis 2). This hypothesis was partially confirmed. Although change in 
intolerance of uncertainty did appear to partially mediate symptom change, the reverse 
mediation effect was also found. In other words, change over time in GAD symptoms as 
assessed by the WAQ also partially mediated change over time in intolerance of 
uncertainty and this indirect effect was in fact greater than in the hypothesized model for 
the full-scale IUS. 
Furthermore, when we examined the role that each of the two IUS factors played 
in GAD symptom reduction, a somewhat more complex pattern emerged. We had 
expected that changes in Factor 1 would mediate GAD symptom change to a greater 
extent than would changes in Factor 2 (Hypothesis 3). Contrary to our expectations, 
however, it was found that Factor 1 was not a strong mediator of GAD symptom change 
during the CBT program, with only 15.87% of the direct effect of time on GAD 
symptoms accounted for by change over time in Factor 1. In contrast, Factor 1 was found 
to be almost fully mediated by change over time in GAD symptoms, with GAD 
symptoms accounting for 96.78% of the direct effect of time on Factor 1. When we 
examined the hypothesized and alternate models for Factor 2, however, we found that 
change in Factor 2 accounted for 37.15% of the direct effect of time on GAD symptoms, 
and change in GAD symptoms accounted for 38.22% of the direct effect of time on 
Factor 2. 
Consistent with the theoretical model on which the current treatment protocol was 
based, our analyses revealed that changes in intolerance of uncertainty did partially 
mediate change in GAD symptoms. However, the different effects of the IUS factors on 
symptom change suggest that not all negative beliefs about uncertainty are equally 
effective in reducing GAD symptoms. Specifically, if we compare the mediation models 
in which the IUS factors served as mediators of GAD symptom change, we can see that 
the percentage of mediation for Factor 2 (i.e., Model 3c; 37.15%) was approximately 
twice that of Factor 1 (i.e., Model 3a; 15.88%). In addition, when the reverse mediation 
effects were tested, GAD symptom change clearly (and almost fully) mediated change in 
Factor 1, with a percentage of mediation (i.e., Model 3b; 96.78%) that was more than 
twice that of Factor 2 (i.e., Model 3d; 38.22%). These findings are of interest here 
because, in addition to helping to clarify the role that intolerance of uncertainty plays in 
reducing GAD symptoms during treatment, it also has the potential to help clinicians 
identify the specific negative beliefs about uncertainty that, if targeted during treatment, 
are most likely to lead to symptom change. 
Although the reasons for the different roles that the two IUS factors appear to play 
in GAD symptom reduction are not yet known, there are several potentially intriguing 
explanations. The first possible explanation relates to the fact that the IUS factors, which 
represent two distinct sets of beliefs about uncertainty, might also be differently related to 
GAD-specific and associated symptoms. Factor 1 consists of items that describe, 
primarily, the negative self-related implications of uncertainty. When taken at face value, 
one might also argue that some of the Factor 1 items reflect or are at least consistent with 
features of depression, including low mood (e.g., "Uncertainty makes me vulnerable, 
unhappy, or sad"), negative views of the self (e.g., "Being uncertain means that I am not 
first rate"), and low self-esteem (e.g., "Being uncertain means that I lack confidence"). 
The factor analyses conducted by Sexton and Dugas (2009) did in fact find that Factor 1 
was more strongly associated with a measure of depressive symptoms than Factor 2. In 
the current study, although the relationship between change over time in intolerance of 
uncertainty and depressive symptoms was not examined, we did calculate partial 
correlations between scores on the BDI-II and each IUS factor at pretreatment. Although 
none of the partial correlations between pretreatment BDI-II and IUS factor scores were 
statistically significant, we nonetheless found a trend in the relationship between BDI-II 
pretreatment scores and Factor 1 of the IUS (pr = .27, p = .06), when controlling for 
Factor 2. It may be that changes in Factor 1 are therefore less likely to mediate GAD-
specific symptom changes directly, and instead might partially mediate change over time 
in depressive symptoms. However, further research would of course be required to test 
this possibility empirically. 
When examining the relationship between the IUS factors and worry, Sexton and 
Dugas (2009) found that both factors were equally and highly related to scores on a 
measure of worry (i.e., PSWQ). In the current sample, however, although partial 
correlations between scores on the PSWQ and each IUS factor were not statistically 
significant at pretreatment, we found a trend in the relationship between PSWQ 
pretreatment scores and Factor 2 of the IUS (pr = .27, p = .06), when controlling for 
Factor 1. That Factor 2 items might be more closely related to worry seems plausible 
given that many of the items appear, at face value, to reflect a future-oriented set of 
concerns (e.g., "I always want to know what the future has in store for me") and a view 
of the self situated in an inherently uncertain world (e.g., "One should always look ahead 
so as to avoid surprises" and "A small unforeseen event can spoil everything even with 
the best planning"). Thus, although we did not examine the potential mediating effect of 
changes in intolerance of uncertainty on worry specifically, it seems possible that 
changes in Factor 2 might be more likely to lead directly to changes in worry during 
treatment due to its future-oriented content. 
A second possible explanation for the different effects of the IUS factors on GAD 
symptom change might lie in the distinct nature of the negative affect represented within 
the IUS factors. As discussed, the affect described by Factor 1 items is consistent with the 
feelings of sadness and low mood associated with depression. Several of the items in 
Factor 2 also assess negative affect. However, the affect represented in Factor 2 appears 
to be characterized primarily by feelings of anxiety, stress or tension, a sense of being 
upset or uneasy, and feelings of frustration (e.g., "Uncertainty makes me uneasy, anxious 
or stressed" and "It frustrates me not having all the information I need"). Items on this 
factor also appear to be more externally-oriented, reflecting somewhat rigid beliefs about 
the degree of certainty that should be attainable (e.g., "I should be able to organize 
everything in advance" and "I can't stand being undecided about my future") and about 
the unfairness of not being able to achieve a desired degree of certainty (e.g., "It's unfair 
having no guarantees in life"). One might argue, as a result, that the affect and beliefs 
reflected in Factor 2 are more consistent with feelings of frustration or even anger than 
with sadness. Although measures of frustration or anger were not included in the present 
study, there is evidence that individuals with anxiety disorders generally (Moscovitch, 
McCabe, Antony, Rocca, & Swinson, 2008), and with GAD specifically (Erdem, Celik, 
Yetkin, & Ozgen, 2008) do experience higher levels of anger than non-anxious 
individuals. Thus, it is interesting to speculate about the potential implications of high 
levels of these emotions among individuals with GAD. 
One potential implication of the presence of anger among individuals with GAD 
can be seen in studies examining the effect of negative affect on information processing. 
There is evidence, for example, that individuals with high levels of trait anxiety are more 
likely to interpret threat/ambiguous stimuli in a threatening manner than individuals with 
low trait anxiety (Richards & French, 1992). Angry and anxious responses may share a 
number of similarities (e.g., over-responsiveness to stress, negative affect) and might 
have similar effects on information processing. In fact, Wenzel and Lystad (2005) found 
that individuals high on either self-reported anger or anxiety rated negative outcomes in 
ambiguous scenarios as more likely than non-angry/anxious individuals. Angry 
individuals also rated positive outcomes as less likely to occur and anger-related 
outcomes as more likely to occur than did high-anxiety or non-angry/anxious individuals. 
Interestingly, both angry and anxious individuals rated anxiety-related outcomes as more 
likely than did non-angry/anxious individuals, suggesting that the effects of anger on 
information processing may be pervasive. Barazzone and Davey (2008) also 
demonstrated a unique causal effect of manipulated levels of anger on interpretation 
biases. Specifically, individuals who received either an anger or anxious mood induction 
were more likely to make threat interpretations of threat/neutral stimuli than those 
receiving positive or neutral mood inductions and the effect of anger remained significant 
even when levels of anxiety were controlled. 
Further research is required to determine whether there are specific and important 
relationships between anger, anxiety, and interpretational biases among individuals with 
GAD, and whether and how these variables are related to the specific beliefs in Factor 2 
of the IUS. In the cognitive model of GAD developed by Dugas and colleagues, one 
proposed pathway from intolerance of uncertainty to GAD symptoms is that beliefs 
related to uncertainty lead to interpretational biases, which in turn lead to elevated levels 
of anxiety. It might be that these biases also lead to elevated levels of anger. However, 
the information processing literature described above suggests that this effect may be 
bidirectional, with elevated levels of anxiety and anger also leading to increased 
interpretational biases. Whether anger plays a direct role, a mediating role, or a 
moderating role in producing these biases remains to be seen. 
One final explanation that might account for the different effects of the IUS 
factors on GAD symptom change during treatment is perhaps the most straightforward. 
We had expected that changes in Factor 1 of the IUS would be more likely to occur than 
changes in Factor 2, given that Factor 1 items reflect beliefs about uncertainty that could 
be directly challenged in between-session exposure exercises. In particular, we expected 
that beliefs about the behavioural implications of uncertainty (e.g., "When it's time to act, 
uncertainty paralyses me") might be difficult to maintain while clients were actively 
entering into uncertainty-inducing situations. In contrast, exposure exercises seemed less 
likely to have an effect on the more external and future-oriented beliefs reflected in 
Factor 2 (e.g., "It's not fair not having any guarantees in life"). As a result, Factor 1 was 
expected to be a stronger mediator of change in GAD symptoms than Factor 2. 
If the above reasoning is correct, this same reasoning also implies that an active 
commitment to behaviour change would be necessary before changes in the beliefs 
associated with Factor 1 could occur. We also know, however, that exposure to 
uncertainty-related situations can be stressful for participants (Dugas & Robichaud, 
2007). It might therefore be more difficult to bring about changes in Factor 1 beliefs than 
in those associated with Factor 2, which might require less behavioural change. 
Consistent with this possibility, the rate of change in Factor 1 of the IUS appears to have 
been slower during the first half of the treatment program (i.e., pre to midtreatment) than 
was the case for Factor 2. There is still the possibility that the treatment protocol might be 
further refined to bring about changes in Factor 1 beliefs earlier on, with the possibility 
that changes in Factor 1 might therefore contribute to the overall mediational effect of 
intolerance of uncertainty to a greater extent. 
Whatever the reasons for the different impact of the IUS factors on GAD 
symptoms during treatment, this study provides a preliminary glimpse into the nature of 
GAD symptom change during the pre-to-posttreatment interval and a clearer 
understanding of the specific ways in which a theoretically relevant cognitive variable 
might serve as a mechanism of symptom change. However, despite its potential to fill a 
gap that currently exists in the treatment process literature, this study also involved 
several limitations. For instance, the current study did not include a control or 
comparison treatment group. It would have been of interest, however, to determine 
whether the interrelationships between daily ratings of worry and somatic anxiety 
observed here also occur among non-clinical individuals, or whether intolerance of 
uncertainty plays the same mediating role in psychological treatments in which it is not 
explicitly targeted. 
Another limitation relates to the limited number of assessments taken during the 
treatment program. Increasing the number of assessment points during treatment can 
allow researchers to examine the nature of mediation with greater precision, in particular 
because this may allow researchers to capture a mediation effect closer to the time at 
which it occurs. As Laurenceau, Hayes, and Feldman (2007) point out, the ability to 
identify the precise action of a mechanism of symptom change during treatment might be 
decreased if assessment of a potential mediator occurs either too early or too late in the 
treatment program. In the present study, it is possible that changes in the beliefs 
associated with Factor 1 on the IUS do mediate symptom change, but perhaps they do so 
at a time that was not captured by the assessments administered here. 
Another limitation in the present study is that we examined the potential 
mediating effect of intolerance of uncertainty on GAD-specific symptoms only. There is 
evidence, however, that intolerance of uncertainty is also related to depressive symptoms 
(Dugas, Schwartz, & Francis, 2004). Given that changes in depressive symptoms also 
occurred, although to a lesser degree than changes in GAD symptoms, future research 
should examine the possibility that changes in intolerance of uncertainty might also 
mediate changes in depressive symptoms during treatment for GAD. In fact, we cannot 
yet rule out the possibility that changes in intolerance of uncertainty actually mediate 
changes in depressive symptoms, which might then lead to subsequent reductions in 
GAD-specific symptoms. Ideally, future studies would assess the relative magnitude of 
the indirect effects of changes of intolerance of uncertainty on depressive symptoms, 
worry, and somatic anxiety individually. In addition, it would be interesting to determine 
whether the magnitude of the indirect effects in these models was moderated by the 
presence of co-morbid anxiety or mood disorders. 
The study described here examined only one of four cognitive variables that are 
proposed to play a role in the maintenance of GAD symptoms in the cognitive model 
developed by Dugas and colleagues (1998). However, when mediated effects were found 
in the current study, these effects only accounted for some of the total effect of time on 
the outcome variable. Future research is needed to determine whether the other three 
cognitive variables in the theoretical model also mediate GAD symptom change during 
treatment (i.e., positive beliefs about worry, negative problem orientation, and cognitive 
avoidance). Multilevel modeling techniques can also be used to determine whether there 
is significant inter-individual variability in the extent to which particular mediators 
function to reduce GAD symptoms. In addition, future studies would also benefit from 
including measures of the mechanisms of symptom change proposed within other 
empirically-supported theoretical models of GAD (e.g., Mennin, Heimberg, Turk, & 
Fresco, 2005; Wells, 2005). Comparisons of the interrelations between theoretical 
constructs and their impact on symptom change might allow us to identify the theoretical 
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constructs that are similarly or differently related to GAD symptom change, and might 
also lead to further refinements of the current CBT protocol. 
One final limitation relates to the size of the sample in the analyses presented 
here. The decision to include 51 individuals in the sample was based on an effort to 
maximize the number of assessment points available for the IUS mediation analyses, 
while also maximizing the number of participants in the sample. Although this decision 
was made primarily for pragmatic reasons, it should be noted that a sample of 51 
individuals is small by some conventional standards. Fritz and MacKinnon (2007) 
provide, for instance, guidelines to researchers when selecting sample sizes for mediation 
analyses. These guidelines are based on effect size estimates of the a and b paths that are 
estimated in mediation models and on the assumption that a power of .80 is desired. They 
suggest that if moderate effect sizes are expected for the paths of the mediation models 
(i.e., 13% variance explained according to Cohen's (1988) suggestions for moderate 
effects), a sample of 74 individuals would be required when using asymmetric confidence 
intervals to detect the presence of mediation, and a sample of 90 participants would be 
required when using the less powerful Sobel test to detect mediation. 
Given the small sample size in the current study, we therefore suggest that the 
results presented here be considered preliminary in nature. However, it should also be 
noted that the suggestions made by Fritz and MacKinnon were not made specifically for 
clinical process studies. In fact, when one examines the sample sizes typical for 
researchers conducting longitudinal multilevel mediation analyses within a clinical 
context, a sample of 51 is well within the reported range of sample sizes, which tend to 
have samples ranging from approximately 30 or 40 participants (e.g., Meuret, Rosenfield, 
Hofinann, Suvak, & Roth, 2009; Teachman, Marker, Smith-Janik, & Shannon, 2008) to 
90 participants (Hofmann, Meuret, Rosenfield, Suvak, Barlow, Gorman et al., 2007). 
While many of these studies may have been underpowered, it is also the case that 
significant mediation effects were found, as was the case in the current study. 
Nonetheless, it would be of interest to determine whether the findings in the current study 
could be replicated in larger samples of individuals with GAD. 
The goal of the current study was to add to the growing volume of treatment 
process literature in which researchers are identifying the nature and predictors of 
symptom change during psychological treatments. The CBT protocol developed by 
Dugas and colleagues is efficacious. However, we are just beginning to identify the 
processes that lead to symptom change, and many questions remain. Nonetheless, it is 
hoped that the analyses described here will provide a step towards a better understanding 
of the nature of GAD symptom change during a treatment that targets worry primarily, 
and insight into the precise role that specific beliefs about uncertainty play in bringing 
about symptom change during CBT for GAD. 
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Footnotes 
'We wish to thank Michael Suvak, PhD, Boston University, for his suggestions about 
how best to combine a time-lagged and mediation analysis in order to model all aspects 
of a mediation relationship statistically in a single analysis. 
The graph lines presented in Figure 3 include daily symptom ratings from all 51 
participants in the sample. Note that only 5 of these 51 individuals provided more than 
135 daily ratings from pre to posttreatment. As a result, the portion of Figure 3 that 
represents daily ratings beyond this point is based on the data provided by only these 5 
individuals (i.e., by less than 10% of the sample). The apparent increase in the proportion 
of time spent worrying, experiencing somatic, and symptoms of depression from day 135 
on is therefore not representative of the full sample. 
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Model la: Worry mediating change in somatic anxiety (hypothesized model) 
Lagged Worry 
(Mediator) 
- / \ 
X X 
Time c Somatic Anxiety 
> 
(Initial Predictor) f (Outcome) 
Model lb: Somatic anxiety mediating change in worry (alternate model) 
Time 
(Initial Predictor) 




Figure 1. Patterns of change in daily symptoms during CBT: hypothesized and alternate 
mediation models. CBT = Cognitive-behavioural therapy. 
61 
Model 2a: IUS (Full-scale) mediating change in the WAQ (hypothesized model) 
Lagged IUS (Full-scale) 
(Mediator) 
« ^ \ 6 
/ \ 
Time c WAQ 
-fr-
Om tial Predictor) (Outcome) 
Model 2b: WAQ mediating change in the IUS (Full-scale) (alternate model) 
Lagged WAQ 
(Mediator) 
Time c IUS (Full-scale) 
(Initial Predictor) (Outcome) 
c' 
Figure 2. IU (Full-scale) as a mediator of symptom change from pretreatment to 6-
month follow-up: hypothesized and alternate mediation models. IU = Intolerance of 
uncertainty; CBT = Cognitive-behavioural therapy; IUS = Intolerance of Uncertainty 
Scale; WAQ = Worry and Anxiety Questionnaire. Figure continues on next page. 
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Model 3a: IUS (Factor 1) mediating change in the WAQ (hypothesized model) 












IUS (Factor 1) 
(Outcome) 
Figure 2. IU (Factor 1) as a mediator of symptom change from pretreatment to 6-month 
follow-up: hypothesized and alternate mediation models. IU = Intolerance of uncertainty; 
CBT = Cognitive-behavioural therapy; IUS = Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale; WAQ = 
Worry and Anxiety Questionnaire. Figure continues on next page. 
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Model 3c: IUS (Factor 2) mediating change in the WAQ (hypothesized model) 
Lagged IUS (Factor 2) 
(Mediator) 
\ b 
Time c WAQ 
(Initial Predictor) (Outcome) 





IUS (Factor 2) 
(Outcome) 
Figure 2. RJ (Factor 2) as a mediator of symptom change from pretreatment to 6-month 
follow-up: hypothesized and alternate mediation models. IU = Intolerance of uncertainty; 
CBT = Cognitive-behavioural therapy; IUS = Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale; WAQ = 
Worry and Anxiety Questionnaire. Continued from previous page. 
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Worry 
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Figure J. Percentage of each day spent experiencing worry, somatic anxiety, and feelings 
of depression during CBT. For ease of visual inspection, graph lines represent mean 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































Sample Clinical Characteristics at Pretreatment (N = 51) 
M SD 
ADIS (CSR) 5.91 0.75 
Duration of GAD (years) 11.30 19 ££ 
WAQ 25.77 3.10 
PSWQ 63.63 7.46 
BDI-II 17.13 10.13 
STAI-T 54.27 7.05 
IUS (Full-Scale) 75.02 22.12 
IUS (Factor 1) 38.53 12.56 
IUS (Factor 2) 36.50 10.36 
Note. ADIS (CSR) = Clinician's Severity Rating of the Anxiety Disorders Interview 
Schedule for DSM-IV; GAD = Generalized anxiety disorder; WAQ = Worry and Anxiety 
Questionnaire; PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; BDI-II = Beck Depression 
Inventory - II; STAI-T = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory - Trait Version; IUS = Intolerance 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Factor Loadings for the Confirmatory Factor Analysis of the IUS (N = 271) 
73 
Item Factor 1 E 
22. Being uncertain means that I lack confidence 0.88 0.84 
17. Uncertainty makes me vulnerable, unhappy, or sad 0.87 0.49 
20. The smallest doubt can stop me from acting 0.85 0.51 
12. When it's time to act, uncertainty paralyses me 0.84 0.52 
15. When I am uncertain I can't function very well 0.84 0.38 
14. When I am uncertain, I can't go forward 0.83 0.42 
13. Being uncertain means that I am not first rate 0.82 0.58 
9. Uncertainty keeps me from living a full life 0.79 0.65 
16. Unlike me, others always seem to know where they 0.78 0.90 
are going with their lives 
1. Uncertainty stops me from having a firm opinion 0.73 0.75 
23. I think it's unfair that other people seem sure about 0.71 0.14 
their future 
24. Uncertainty keeps me from sleeping soundly 0.69 1.03 
25. I must get away from all uncertain situations 0.69 0.63 
3. Uncertainty makes life intolerable : 0.64 0.73 
2. Being uncertain means that a person is disorganized 0.54 0.76 
Note. IUS = Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale; Factor 1 = Uncertainty has negative 
behavioural and self-referent implications; E - standardized error variance. All factor 
loadings are significant when a = .05. Table continues on next page. 
Table 6 (Continued from previous page) 
Factor Loadings for the Confirmatory Factor Analysis of the IUS (N — 271) 
Item Factor 2 E 
10. One should always look ahead so as to avoid surprises 0.89 0.73 
18. I always want to know what the future has in store for me... 0.87 0.64 
19. I can't stand being taken by surprise 0.85 0.52 
11. A small unforeseen event can spoil everything 0.81 0.57 
even with the best of planning 
21. I should be able to organize everything in advance 0.81 0.68 
5. My mind can't be relaxed if I don't know what will 0.79 0.70 
happen tomorrow 
7. Unforeseen events upset me greatly 0.77 0.64 
8. It frustrates me not having all the information I need 0.75 0.69 
26 The ambiguities in life stress me 0.74 0.54 
6. Uncertainty makes me uneasy, anxious, or stressed 0.71 0.51 
27. I can't stand being undecided about my future 0.70 0.88 
4. It's unfair not having any guarantees in life 0.57 1.07 
Note. See Appendix A for a description of the IUS confirmatory factor analysis. IUS = 
Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale; Factor 2 = Uncertainty is unfair and spoils everything; 
E = standardized error variance. All factor loadings are significant when a = .05. 
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Appendix A 
A Confirmatory Factor Analysis of the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale 
in a Clinical Sample 
The Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS) was developed by Freeston et al. 
(1994) to assess the negative beliefs about uncertainty that individuals with GAD appear 
to hold. Although the IUS has typically been administered in treatment outcome studies 
as a single-factor measure (e.g., Dugas et al., 2010; Ladouceur, Dugas et al., 2000), a 
number of factor analyses have been conducted since its development. These analyses 
suggest that the IUS may in fact assess distinct subsets of negative beliefs about 
uncertainty. For example, in an exploratory factor analysis conducted on the original 
French version of the measure, Freeston et al. (1994) identified five negative beliefs 
about uncertainty in a non-clinical sample of worriers. These beliefs included the idea 
that (a) uncertainty is unacceptable and should be avoided, (b) being uncertain reflects 
badly on a person, (c) uncertainty is frustrating, (d) uncertainty causes stress, and (e) 
uncertainty prevents action. A more recent exploratory factor analysis was conducted on 
an English translation of the IUS by Buhr and Dugas (2002). This analysis identified four 
distinct negative beliefs about uncertainty, including the idea that (a) uncertainty prevents 
a person from being able to act, (b) uncertainty is stressful and upsetting, (c) unexpected 
events are negative and should be avoided, and (d) being uncertain about the future is 
unfair. However, subsequent factor analyses have failed to replicate either a four or five-
factor structure (e.g., Norton, 2005; Carleton, Norton, & Asmundson, 2007). 
In order to clarify the factor structure of the IUS, Sexton and Dugas (2009) 
conducted exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses on the English version of the 
measure. These studies involved the largest non-clinical samples to date (i.e., N= 1,230 
and N = 1,221, respectively) and were consistent in identifying, and confirming, a two-
factor solution. The first factor was found to be represented by 15 of the 27 items on the 
IUS, and appeared to reflect the belief that uncertainty has negative behavioural and self-
referential implications (e.g., "When it's time to act, uncertainty paralyses me" and 
"Being uncertain means that I lack confidence"). The second factor appeared to be 
represented by the 12 remaining items on the IUS and seemed to reflect the belief that 
uncertainty is unfair and spoils everything (e.g., "It's unfair not having any guarantees in 
life" and "One should always look ahead so as to avoid surprises"). 
Despite the evidence of a two-factor structure for the IUS, however, the analyses 
conducted by Sexton and Dugas (2009) were conducted in non-clinical samples. The 
two-factor structure of the IUS has not yet been confirmed in a clinical sample. As a 
result, we conducted a preliminary confirmatory factor analysis on a clinical sample of 
individuals (N = 271) who met DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for GAD and who had 
volunteered to participate in one of several treatment outcome studies examining the 
efficacy of CBT for GAD. All participants had completed the French version of the IUS 
prior to the start of their first treatment sessions, which were conducted sometime 
between 2003 and 2009. The sample consisted of 86 males and 185 females, all of whom 
were Francophone, and who had an average age of44.96 years (SD = 11.78). 
The confirmatory factor analysis reported here was conducted using the structural 
equation modeling program EQS, Version 6.1 (Bentler, 1995; Bentler & Wu, 1995). 
Before proceeding with the analysis, the total IUS scores and all 27 IUS items were 
assessed for skewness and kurtosis. Although the total IUS scores were normally 
distributed, two of the 27 items were significantly skewed. There was also a significant 
degree of kurtosis observed among the IUS items (Mardia's coefficient of multivariate 
kurtosis = 70.68, normalized estimate Z = 14.70). As a result, the elliptical (ERLS) 
method of factor extraction was employed, as this method is preferred for non-normally 
distributed data and is less prone to error in analyses involving small samples (Kline, 
1998). Given that the two proposed factors were thought to represent different aspects of 
the same construct, they were allowed to co-vary in our analysis. 
All items on the IUS loaded significantly onto their respective factor, with factor 
loadings ranging from 0.54 to 0.89, and the correlation between the factors was r = 0.78 
(see Table 6). The two-factor solution generally met conventional standards for good 
model fit. The independence model chi square test was significant 0^(351) - 16,044.03, 
p < .001), indicating that there was at least some relationship among the IUS items to be 
analyzed. However, the model chi square test, which assesses the degree of fit between 
the sample covariance matrix and the estimated population covariance matrix, was also 
significant (323) = 1191.19, p < .001). Ideally, this goodness of fit index should be 
non-significant. However, this index has also been found to be unreliable because it is 
closely associated with sample size (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). As a result, other fit 
indices were used to evaluate the two-factor model. The model produced a Bentler-
Bonett normed fit index (NFI) of .93 (NFIs > .90 are indicative of good model fit; 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007), a comparative fit index (CFI) of .95 (CFIs > .95 indicate 
good fit; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007), and a standardized root-mean-square residual 
(SRMR) of .078 (SRMRs < .08 are recommended; Hu & Bentler, 1999), although the 
root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA) was higher than ideal at .10 
(RMSEAs < .06 are recommended; Bentler & Wu, 1999). However, this final index may 
produce values that are overestimates in small samples (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
The preliminary confirmatory factor analysis described here was conducted on a 
small but adequately sized sample, by conventional standards (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2007). Despite the small sample size, however, a two-factor solution generally appeared 
to be a good fit for the data. The fit indices reported here are similar to those reported by 
Sexton and Dugas (2009) in their much larger non-clinical sample (i.e., N = 1,221; NFI = 
.96; CFI = .97; SRMR = .05; RMSEA = .07). For comparative purposes, however, and 
given that the IUS has most frequently been used as a single-factor measure, we also 
assessed a single-factor solution. The model chi square test of the single-factor solution 
indicated a poor model fit (%2(324) - 1876.98,/? < .001), and this solution also proved to 
be less than adequate on several additional indices of goodness-of-fit (i.e., Bentler-Bonett 
NFI = .88; CFI = .90; SRMR - .08; RMSEA = .13). When the model chi square estimates 
were compared directly, the two-factor solution provided a superior fit to the data, A^2(l) 
= 685.79,/? < .001. On the basis of this preliminary analysis, we felt confident in 
proceeding with mediation analyses that examined the potential role that both the full-
scale IUS, and its two factors, might play in bringing about change over time in GAD 
symptoms during cognitive-behavioural therapy. 
Appendix B 
RECRUITMENT ADVERTISEMENT 
Etes-vous une personne inquiete? 
Le Laborato i re des troubles anxieux de I 'Universite Concord ia en 
col laborat ion avec la Clinique des troubles anxieux de I 'Hopital du 
Sacre-Coeur de Montreal est a la recherche de personnes qui s'inquietent de 
fa^on excessive ou exageree pour part ic iper a une etude evaluant 
un t ra i tement psychologique ayant deja fait preuve de son efficacite. 
Si vous avez entre 18 et 65 ans et que vous etes en bonne sante physique, 
vous pourr iez etre eligible pour part iciper a I'etude. 
Pour plus d ' informat ion, veuillez telephoner au : 514 848-2424, poste 5085 
Labora to i re des t roubles anxieux 
Di rec teu r : Michel Dugas, Ph.D., psychologue 
Concordia 
U N I V E R S I T Y 
U N I V E R S I T Y 
www.concordia.ca 
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ncordia H S C M 
U N I V £ R S I T r 
Formulaire d'information et de conscntement tetephonique 
( l e partie : Evaluation de ['admissibility 
Titre de l'Stude : La thlrapie cognitivo-comportementale pour le trouble d'anxidtd glnlralisle : 
Impact du traitement de I'information sur l'efficacit£ thdrapeutique i court et & long terme 
A. BUT DE L'ETUDE 
Le but de cette dtude est d'6valuer l ' impact des biais de traitement de I ' informat ion sur Pefficacitd k court 
et k long terme de la th^rapie cognitivo-comportementale pour le trouble d 'anx i&6 g6n6ralis6e (TAG). La 
premiere partie de l '6tude consiste & 6valuer de fa$on prt l iminaire la nature et la s6v6rit6 de vos sympt6mes 
anxieux afin de determiner si vous rencontrez les ent i res de selection pour passer k la seconde 6tape 
devaluat ion et par la suite recevoir le traitement pour le trouble d'anxidte gen^ralis^e. 
Chercheur p r i n c i p a l : Michel Dugas, Ph.D. Professeur titulaire, University Concordia 
Chercheur, Centre de recherche H S C M 
INFORMATION 
B. PROCEDURES 
Dans un premier temps, vous participerez k une entrevue devaluat ion tel£phonique (dur£e lh30) avec une 
psychologue de l'6quipe. 
S' i l semble que vous rencontrez les ent ires de selection de l'Etude, vous serez rEfErE(e) k la Clinique des 
troubles anxieux de I 'H6pi ta l du SacrE-Coeur de Montreal, ou vous serez evaluE(e) a nouveau par un(e) 
psychiatre de notre Equipe. Cette Evaluation se dEroule en personne et est d'une durEe d'une heure trente 
environ. AprEs cette rencontre, les membres de l'Equipe de recherche (psychologues, psychiatres et 
chercheur principal) se rEunissent pour discuter et verif ier si vous rencontrez bien les critEres requis pour 
l'Etude. Nous vous ferons ensuite part de la decision de l'Equipe. 
Si vous rencontrez les critEres pour etre inclus(e) dans l'Etude, vous aurez & signer un autre formulaire de 
consentement concernant la suite de l'Etude. 
C. RISQUES ET BENEFICES 
1. Risques, effets secondaires et dEsagrlments 
II n'est pas impossible que certaines questions provoquent un lEger malaise & court terme (possiblement en 
vous faisant rEflEchir & vos d i f f i cu l t y ) . Par contre, cette entrevue a dEja EtE utilisEe k plusieurs reprises 
auprEs des personnes anxieuses et les malaises sont rares. Si cela vous arrive, nous vous prions d'en 
discuter avec nous. 
2. BEnEfices et avantages 
En participant & cette Etude, vous bEnEficierez d'une Evaluation dEtaillEe de votre Etat. Evidemment, si vous 
rencontrez les critEres de sElection pour l'Etude de traitement, vous recevrez une psychothErapie efficace 
pour le traitement du TAG. ParallElement, vous pourrez contribuer a l'avancement des connaissances en 
participant & cette Etude. 
D. CONDITIONS DE PARTICIPATION 
1. Versement d'une indemnity 
Vous ne recevrez aucune rEmunEration pour votre participation § ce volet devaluat ion. 
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2. Confidentiality 
Tous les renseignements recueillis k votre sujet demeureront strictement confidentiels, dans les limites 
pr^vues par la loi, et vous ne serez identifi6(e) que par un code. 
3. Indemnisation en cas de prejudice 
En acceptant de participer k cette 6tude, vous ne renoncez a aucun de vos droits et vous ne lib^rez pas les 
chercheurs, l 'organisme subventionnaire (Instituts de recherche en sant6 du Canada) ou les 6tablissements 
impliqu£s de leurs responsabilit6s tegales et professionnelles. 
4. Participation volontaire et retrait de 1'etude 
Votre participation k cette £tude est volontaire. Vous etes done libre de refuser d ' y participer. Vous pouvez 
egalement vous retirer de 1'etude k n ' importe quel moment, sans avoir k donner de raisons, en faisant 
connaitre votre decision au chercheur ou k l 'un des membres de l '^quipe de recherche. 
CONSENTEMENT 
o Je comprends que je donne mon consentement verbal pour que l'Equipe de recherche E value si j e 
rencontre les critEres de sElection de l'Etude. 
o Je comprends que j e peux retirer mon consentement et interrompre ma participation a tout 
moment, sans consEquences nEgatives. 
o Je comprends que ma participation h cette Etude est C O N F I D E N T I E L L E (c.-&-d. les membres de 
l'Equipe connaissent mon identitE mais ne la rEvEleront pas). 
J'AI ECOUTE ATTENTIVEMENT CE QUI M'A ETE LU ET JE COMPRENDS LA NATURE DE 
CETTE ETUDE: OUI NON 
JE CONSENS DONC VERBALEMENT, DE FAQON LIBRE ET VOLONTAIRE A PARTICIPER A 
L'EVALUATION TELEPHONIQUE ET S'LL Y A LIEU A LA RENCONTRE AVEC UN(E) 
PSYCHIATRE DE L'EQUIPE : 
OUI NON 
NOM DU PARTICIPANT : DATE : 
NOM DU MEMBRE DE L'EQUIPE : HEURE : 
SIGNATURE DATE 
Si vous avez des questions & poser au sujet de cette Etude, vous pouvez contacter en tout temps la direction 
gEnErale de I 'Hopi ta l du SacrE-Coeur de MontrEal au (514) 338-2222, poste 3581. 
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D E M O N T R E A L 
U N I 
ncord ia 
U N I V E R S I T Y 
T E 
H S C M 
FORMULAIRE D'INFORMATION ET DE CONSENTEMENT 
Titre de l'etude: La thy rap ie cognitivo-comportementale pour le trouble d'anxiete gEneralisEe : 
Impact du traitement de 1'information sur l 'eff icacite therapeutique a court et & long terme 
Chercheur: Michel Dugas, Ph.D. (psychologie) 
Chercheur regulier, Centre de recherche, H S C M 
Psychologue, Cl inique des troubles anxieux, H S C M 
Professeur titulaire, DEpartement de psychologie, University Concordia 
T61: 514-338-4201 ou 514-848-2424 (poste 2215) 
Cour r ie l : Michel.Dugas@concordia.ca 
Professeur adjoint, DEpartement de psychologie, University Concordia 
T61: 514-848-2424 (poste 2202) 
Natalie Phil l ips, Ph.D. (psychologie) 
Professeur agr£g6, DEpartement de psychologie, University Concordia 
T61: 514-848-2424 (poste 2218) 
Wi l l iam Bukowski , Ph.D. (psychologie) 
Professeur titulaire, D6partement de psychologie, University Concordia 
T61: 514-848-2424 (poste 2184) 
Julie Turcotte, M .D . (psychiatrie) 
Professeur adjoint, Dypartement de psychiatrie, 
Co-chercheurs: Adam Radomsky, Ph.D. (psychologie) 
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Faculty de Mydecine, University de Montreal 
Psychiatre, Clinique des troubles anxieux, H S C M 
T e l : 514-338-4201 
Pierre Savard, M.D. , Ph.D. (microbiologic et immunologic) 
Professeur adjoint, Departement de psychiatrie, 
Faculty de Mydecine, University de Montryal 
Psychiatre, Clinique des troubles anxieux, H S C M 
T y i : 514-338-4201 
Adrienne Gaudet, M.D. (psychiatrie) 
Professeur adjoint, Dypartement de psychiatrie, 
Faculty de Mydecine, University de Montryal 
Psychiatre, Cl inique des troubles anxieux, H S C M 
m : 514-338-4201 
Organisme 
de subvention : Instituts de recherche en santy du Canada 
410 avenue Laurier ouest, 9eme etage, indice de l'adresse 4209A, 
Ottawa, Ontario, K 1 A 0 W 9 
INFORMATION 
1. Nature et objectif de 1'ltude 
Nous savons aujourd'hui que les personnes atteintes de troubles anxieux ont certains biais dans leur fafon 
de traiter 1' information provenant de leur environnement. Par exemple, les personnes anxieuses tendent k 
porter leur attention plus rapidement k certains « signes de danger » et & interpryter certaines situations 
ambigugs de fa9on mena9ante . Par contre, nous ne savons pas si 1'ampleur de ces biais affecte la ryponse k 
la psychothyrapie. En d'autres mots, nous ne savons pas si les personnes anxieuses qui prysentent des biais 
plus importants dans leur fa?on de traiter I ' informat ion rypondent diflfyremment aux interventions 
psychologiques. 
Le but de cette etude est d'evaluer Pimpact des biais de traitement de I ' informat ion sur l 'eff icacite & court 
et k long terme de la th^rapie cognitivo-comportementale pour le trouble d'anxiete g6n6ralis6e (TAG) . Plus 
particuliSrement, nous voulons : (1) ^valuer l ' impact des biais « pre-therapie » sur la reponse k cette 
thfrapie; et (2) 6valuer l ' impact des biais « post-therapie » sur le maintien des gains th£rapeutiques suite k 
la tWrapie. A f in d'evaluer I 'ampleur des biais de traitement de I ' information, nous nous proposons 
d'uti l iser trois taches informatiques qui sont expliqu^es ci-dessous. 
Cent dix (110) adultes avec un diagnostic principal de trouble d 'anxiete g6n6ralis6e participeront a cette 
^tude. Les participants seront recrutls & la Clinique des troubles anxieux de l 'Hopi ta l du Sacr&-Coeur de 
Montreal ou par le biais d'annonces plac^es dans le quotidien La Presse. 
2. D6roulement de l'£tude et method es utilisccs 
Les grandes lignes pour la suite de Petude sont les suivantes : (1) Evaluation pre-therapie en deux 
rencontres; (2) th£rapie cognitivo-comportementale administree en 14 rencontres hebdomadaires; (3) 
Evaluation post-therapie en huit rencontres sur une periode de 18 mois. 
Premier volet: Evaluation pre-therapie 
Suite & revaluat ion de vos symptomes d 'anxiete - entrevues telephoniques et entrevue psychiatrique k la 
Clinique des troubles anxieux - nous avons determine que vous rencontrez les criteres d' inclusion de cette 
etude. Vous participerez maintenant k une rencontre d 'environ deux heures avec une psychologue de notre 
equipe (Isabelle Geninet, Pascale Harvey ou Amei ie Seidah) - le but de cette rencontre est d'evaluer vos 
traits de personnalite ou votre fapon habituelle de reagir aux evenements de tous les jours. Au cours de cette 
rencontre, vous aurez aussi k completer des questionnaires portant sur vos symptomes d 'anxiete. Par la 
suite, vous aurez k participer k une derni&re rencontre devaluat ion pendant laquelle vous ferez trois taches 
sur un ordinateur et repondrez k des questionnaires. En ce qui concerne les taches informatiques, vous ferez 
une tache evaluant votre fa9on de porter attention a certains mots et deux taches evaluant votre fapon de 
comprendre certaines situations. Chacune des trois taches prend environ 20 minutes k completer. Vous 
repondrez ensuite a des questionnaires qui ont pour but d'evaluer votre etat general. Cela vous prendre 
environ 20 minutes pour rEpondre aux questionnaires. La durEe totale de cette rencontre (directives, taches 
informatiques, pause et questionnaires) sera d 'environ une heure et demie. 
Deuxieme volet: Therapie cognitivo-comportementale 
En participant a cette Etude, vous recevrez une psychothErapie efficace pour le traitement du TAG. Cette 
thErapie, de type cognitivo-comportementale, pourrait vous aider a comprendre et & changer les 
comportements et pensEes qui contribuent & vos d i f f i c u l t y . La durEe de cette thErapie est de quatre mois 
(14 rencontres hebdomadaires de 50 minutes) et elle vous sera administrEe par une des psychologues de 
notre Equipe. Entre les rencontres, vous aurez des lectures a faire et des exercices i i pratiquer. 
Troisieme volet: Evaluation post-therapie 
Af in d'Evaluer les effets de la psychothErapie k long terme, vous serez EvaluE(e) & sept reprises, sur une 
pEriode de 18 mois, suite & votre thErapie. ImmEdiatement aprEs la thErapie, vous participerez & deux 
rencontres devaluat ion (rencontre 1 : entrevue diagnostique et questionnaires; rencontre 2 : taches A 
l 'ordinateur et questionnaires). Par la suite, vous participerez & une rencontre devaluat ion (entrevue 
diagnostique et questionnaires) & six reprises, c'est-a-dire aux relances de 3, 6, 9, 12, 15 et 18 mois. 
3. Risques, effets secondaires et dEsagrements 
Evaluations 
I I n'est pas impossible que certaines taches ou certains questionnaires provoquent un lEger malaise 4 court 
terme (possiblement en vous faisant rEflEchir & vos difficultEs). Par contre, ces taches et questionnaires ont 
dEj& EtE utilisEs a plusieurs reprises aupres des personnes anxieuses et les malaises sont rares. Si cela vous 
arrive, nous vous prions d 'en discuter avec la professionnelle de recherche ou avec votre thErapeute. 
Psychotherapie 
I I est possible que quelques uns des exercices presents par votre psychologue provoquent certains malaises 
a court terme. Ceux-ci sont temporaires et disparaissent habituellement avec la pratique r£p£t£e de ces 
exercices. 
Si vous recevez un medicament de votre medecin ou de votre psychiatre au moment du debut de 1'etude, 
cela demeure la responsabilite de ce dernier pendant la duree du traitement. Cependant, nous vous 
demandons seulement de ne pas augmenter le dosage de votre medication ou de modif ier le type de 
medicament sans en avertir prealablement votre therapeute. 
4. Benefices et avantages 
Tel que mentionne precedemment, en participant k cette etude, vous recevrez une psychotherapie efficace 
pour le traitement du TAG. De plus, cette therapie vous sera offerte par des psychologies qui sont des 
experts dans son application. Vous profiterez aussi d'une evaluation plus poussee de votre etat, avec un 
suivi sur une periode de 18 tnois aprds (a f in de la psychotherapie. Paralieiement, vous allez nous aider k 
mieux evaluer les facteurs qui influencent l 'eff icacite de cette therapie et ainsi contribuer & l'avancement 
des connaissances en participant & cette etude. 
5. Versement d'une indemnity 
Vous ne recevrez aucune remuneration pour votre participation k la premiere partie de cette etude 
(evaluation pr6-therapie, psychotherapie et evaluation immediatement aprfcs la therapie). Par contre, vous 
recevrez une compensation de 30$ pour chacune des six rencontres de relance (3, 6 , 9 , 12, 15 et 18 mois 
apnbs la f in de la psychotherapie). Done, si vous vous presentez pour toutes les rencontres de relances, vous 
recevrez une indemnite de 180$. 
6. Confidentiality 
Tous les renseignements recueill is a votre sujet au cours de 1'etude demeureront strictement confidentiels, 
dans les l imites prevues par la lo i , et vous ne serez identifie(e) que par un code. Les rencontres avec les 
psychologies seront enregistrEes sur cassettes audio af in de nous permettre d'Evaluer la qualitE des 
interventions offertes par celles-ci (les cassettes seront aussi identifiEes par un code). ImmEdiatement aprEs 
l'Etude, toutes les cassettes seront dEtruites. Aucune publication ou communication scientifique rEsultant de 
cette Etude ne renfermera quoi que ce soit qui puisse permettre de vous identifier. 
Cependant, k des fins de controle du projet de recherche, votre dossier pourra etre consultE par une 
personne mandatEe par le comite d'ethique de la recherche de l 'Hopi ta l du SacrE-Coeur ainsi que par des 
reprEsentants de Porganisme de subvention (Instituts de recherche en santE du Canada). Tous ces 
organismes adherent a une polit ique de stricte confidentialitE. 
7. Indemnisation en cas de prEjudice 
Si vous deviez subir quelque prEjudice que ce soit rEsultant de votre participation k cette Etude, vous 
recevrez tous les soins mEdicaux nEcessaires, sans frais de votre part. Toutefois, ceci ne vous empeche 
nullement d'exercer un recours lEgal en cas de faute reprochEe k toute personne impliquEe dans l'Etude. 
En acceptant de participer a cette Etude, vous ne renoncez k aucun de vos droits ni ne libErez les chercheurs, 
l 'organisme subventionnaire (Instituts de recherche en santE du Canada) ou les Etablissements impliquEs de 
leurs responsabilitEs lEgales et professionnelles. 
8. Participation volontaire et retrait de l'Etude 
Votre participation k cette Etude est volontaire. Vous etes done libre de refuser d 'y participer. Vous pouvez 
Egalement vous retirer de l'Etude k n ' importe quel moment, sans avoir k donner de raisons, en faisant 
connaftre votre dEcision au chercheur ou a l 'un des membres de l'Equipe de recherche. Toute nouvelle 
connaissance acquise durant le dEroulement de l'Etude qui pourrait afTecter votre dEcision de continuer d ' y 
participer vous sera communiquEe sans dElai. 
Votre dEcision de vous en retirer n'aura aucune consEquence sur les soins qui vous seront fournis par la 
suite ou sur vos relations avec votre mEdecin et les autres intervenants. 
93 
9. Personnes a contacter 
Si vous avez des questions & poser au sujet de cette Etude ou s ' i l survient un incident quelconque ou si vous 
dEsirez vous retirer de l'Etude, vous pouvez contacter en tout temps le Dr Miche l Dugas (le chercheur 
principal de l'Etude) aux numeros de tElEphone suivants : 
Lundi, mardi, jeudi et vendredi : (514) 848-2424, poste 2215 (DEpartement de psychologie, University 
Concordia) 
Mercred i : (514) 338-4201 (Clinique des troubles anxieux, Hopital du Sacre-Coeur) 
Si vous voulez poser des questions & un professionnel ou & un chercheur qui n'est pas impliquE dans cette 
Etude, vous pouvez communiquer avec Dr. Normand Lussier, omnipraticien a la Clinique des troubles 
anxieux, au (514) 338-4201. 
Si vous avez des questions a poser concernant vos droits en tant que participant «k un projet de recherche, ou 
si vous avez des plaintes ou des commentaires a formuler, vous pouvez communiquer avec la direction 
gEnErale de l 'hdpital , au (514) 338-2222, poste 3581. 
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CONSENTEMENT 
La thErapie cognitivo-comportementale pour le trouble d'anxiEte gEnEralisEe : Impact du traitement de 
l ' informat ion sur I'efficacitE thErapeutique & court et & long terme 
La nature de cette Etude, les procEdEs & utiliser, les risques et les bEnEfices que comporte ma participation & 
cette Etude ainsi que le caractEre confidentiel des informations qui seront recueillies au cours de l'Etude 
m'ont EtE expliquEs. 
J'ai eu Foccasion de poser toutes mes questions concernant les difTErents aspects de cette Etude et on y a 
rEpondu h ma satisfaction. 
Je reconnais qu 'on m'a laissE le temps voulu pour prendre ma dEcision. 
J'accepte volontairement de participer & cette Etude. Je demeure libre de m'en retirer en tout temps sans que 
cela ne nuise aux relations avec mon mEdecin ou les autres intervenants et sans prEjudice d'aucune sorte. 
Je recevrai une copie signEe de ce formulaire d ' informat ion et de consentement. 
N o m du sujet Signature Date 
(en lettres moulEes) 
N o m du chercheur Signature Date 
ou de son reprEsentant 
(en lettres moulEes) 
Appendix D 
ETHICS APPROVAL FORMS 
Concordia 
U N I V E R S I T Y 
CERTIFICATION OF ETHICAL ACCEPTABILITY 
FOR RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS 
Name of Applicant: 
Department: 
Agency: 
Title of Project: 
Michel J. Dugas 
Psychology 
CIHR submitted fall '05 
Cognitive-Behavioural Treatment for 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder: Impact of 
Cognitive Processing on Short- and Long-
Term Outcomes 
Certification Number: UH2005-093 
Valid From: 4/22/2008 to 4/22/2009 
The members of the University Human Research Ethics Committee have 
examined the application for a grant to support the above-named project, 
and consider the experimental procedures, as outlined by the applicant, 
to be acceptable on ethical grounds for research involving human 
31/05/2007 
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H S C M 
T1TRE: 
L I E U : 
A P P R O B A T I O N D ' U N P R O J E T D E R E C H E R C H E 
La th&apie cognitivo-comporteroentale pour le trouble d'anxiitA g e n e r a l i s e : Impact da traitement de 
11 information sur I'efficacitE therapeutique & court et a long terme Version clu 11 ncnembre 2005 
Hopital du Sacre -Cour de Montreal, 5400, b o u l Gouin Quest, Montreal (Quebec) H4J 1C5 
C H K R C H E U R ( s ) : Michel Dugas, Ph. D., Adam Radomsky, Ph. D., Natalie Phillips, Ph. D., William Bukowski, Ph. 
D., Julie Turcotte, M J X , Pierre Savard, M.D., Ph. D. , et Adrienne Gaudet, M.D. 
P R O V E N A N C E D E S F O N D S : Instituts de recherche en santS du Canada 
P R O B L i M A T I Q U E et 
O B J E C T I F D E L ' E T U D E : 
T Y P E D E R E C H E R C H E : 
A D M I S S I B I L I T Y D E S S U J E T S : 
L E S C O N S E Q U E N C E S E T H I Q U E S : 
Liberty de part iciper oui 
Confidentielite: oui 
6valuer si les biais dans le traitement cognitif (attention et interpretation) 
pr idisent une mains grande efficacit i de la T C C pour le T A G k court et i long terme 
£ tude evaluative dans une population souflrant de p rob l imes de sant i mentale 
Adultes (cntre 13 et 6S ans) ayant un diagnostic primaire de trouble d'anxi&£ 
ginfaalisce. Les individua ayant des pr£occupations siiicidaires ou atteintes de 
schizophrenic, de trouble bipolaire ou de trouble mental organique seront 
exclus 
Consentement AclairA: oui 
Libertd d ' en sortir sans contrainte : oui 
F O R M U L A I R E D E C O N S E N T E M E N T : requis: oui 
appronvd: oui 
(version initiale d u 11 itovembre 2005) 
Le 21 novembre 2005 
C O M I T f c D ' i T H I Q U E : N o d e c o d e : C.E. 2005-10-€2 
D A T E D E L ' t T U D E P A R L E C O M T r t : 2 4 o c t o b r e 2 0 0 5 (seancepl4nl4re) 
6 s e p t e m b r e 2 0 0 6 (renouvellement) 
1 " oc tobre 2007 (renouvellement) 
AVIS F A V O R A B L E : 
M E M B R E S D U C O M I T E D E T H I Q U E D E L A R E C H E R C H E E T D E 
L ' E V A L U A T I O N D E S T E C H N O L O G I E S D E L A SANTfc 
Dre Chantal Lambert, scientifique non mAdecin, pris idente 
M m e Marie-France Thibaudeau, scientifique non midecm, vice-prfsidente 
M. Guy Beauregard, personne s p e c i a l i s t en Athique 
Me Chanta] Roy, jurists 
Dr Marcel Boulanger, raembre non affilie reprAsentant la collectivity 
M m e Henriette Bourassa, nieinbie non aff i l i i icprAsentant la collectivity 
M m e Isabelle Larouche, scientifique non midec in 
Dre Jadranlca Spahija, scientifique non medecin 
Dr Axel Tosikyan, scientifique medecin 
Dr Colin Verdant, scientifiqae m6dccin 
Marie-France Thibaudeau 
N . B . : L e C o m i t * d'iSthlque d e la r e c h e r c h e de F H S C M poa r su i t ses acthr l t is en a c c o r d avec La bomus pratiques clbtiques (Santi Canada) et t ous lea r E l e m e n t s applicable* 
Appendix E 
THE DAILY SELF-MONITORING BOOKLET 
Daily Self-Monitoring Booklet 
Page 1: Percentage of Each Day Spent Worrying 
No. Dossier: ThErapeute: 
Semaine du au 
1. Quelle a 6t£ la proportion de la journle pendant laquelle vous avez 
6t£ inquiet-tte aujourd'hui? (cote en %) 
0% 25% 50% 75% 100% 




Page 2: Percentage of Each Day Spent Experiencing Somatic Anxiety 
No. Dossier: ThErapeute: 
Semaine du au 
2. Quelle a 6t£ la proportion de la journle pendant laquelle vous avez 
6t£ anxieux-se ou tendu-e aujourd'hui? (cote en %) 
0% 25% 50% 75% 100% 




Daily Self-Monitoring Booklet 
Page 3: Percentage of Each Day Experiencing Feelings of Depression 
No. Dossier: Therapeute: 
Semaine du au 
3. Quelle a 6t£ la proportion de la jour nee pendant laquelle vous avez 
£t£ triste ou d£prim£-e aujourd'hui? (cote en %) 
0% 25% 50% 75% 100% 




Page 4: Daily Record of the Type and Quantity of Psychoactive Medication 
No. Dossier: Th&apeate: —- -- -
Semaine du au 
4. Si vous avez pris des medicaments aujourd'hui, indiquez la sorte et 
la quantity to tale pour la journle. 
0% 25% 50% 75% 100% 
Date 










No. Dossier Date 
1. Quels sont les sujets a propos desquels vous vous inquillez le plus souvent? 
a ) d) 
b ) e) 
c ) 0 
Poor les nonpros suivants, encerclez le chiffre correspondant (0 a 8). 
2. Est-ce que vos inquietudes vous sembtent excessives CHI exag£r6es? 
Aucunement Mod£rement Complete ment 
excessives excessives excessives 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
3. Durant les demiers six mois, combien de jours avez -vous eie trouble-e par des inquietudes excessives? 
1 jour A tous 
Jamais sur 2 les jours 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
4. Est-ce que vous avez de la difficulty k contrfller vos inquietudes? Par exemple, lorsque vous commeneez k 
vous inquieier a propos de quelque chose, avez-vous de la difficult^ & vous arrgter? 
Aucune Difficult Difficult 
difficult^ mod£ree exd£me 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
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5. Durant les derniers six mois, avez-vous souvent €\& trouble-e par une ou l'autre des sensations suivantes 
lorsque vous etiez inquiet-ete ou anxieux-se? Colez chaque sensation en encerclant un chiffre (0 a 8). 
a) Agi&e, surexcite-e ou avoir les nerfs k vif 
Aucunement Moderement 











c) Difficult & se concentrer ou btanc de me moire 
Aucunement Moderement 














f) Probtemes de sommeil (difficult & tomber ou resfer endormi-e ou sommeil agite et insatisfaisant) 
Trfes 
Aucunenent Moderement severe ment 
.0. . 1 . .8. 
6. A quel point est-ce que I'anxiete ou Tinquietude interfile avec votre vie, e'est-^-dire votre travail, activites 
sociales, famine, etc? 
Tits 
Aucunenent Moderement severe ment 
. 1 . .8. 
Datas. M. 1 . Heestan. M. H, Provmchci. M D.. Laduoce. s.. Lataooen. R_ & GossGa P. (2001 x Journal deTtfrzpie 
Conpantma*de a Cogttthr. 11(1% 31J& 
Appendix G 




N o . D o s s i e r D a t e _ 
VeuiDez utifiser TecheOe ci-dessous pour exprimer jusqu'a quel point chacun des enonces suivants correspond 
a vous. Encerclez le numero (1 a 5) approprie. 
Pas d u 
tout c o r r e s -
pondan t 
Un peu 
c o r r e s -
pondan t 
Assez 
c o r r e s -
pondan t 
T r6s 
c o r r e s -
ponden t 
Ext r6mement 
co r r e s -
pondant 
1. Si je n'ai pas assez de temps pom-
tout fare, je ne m'inquiete pas. ... 
2. Mes inquietudes me submergenL 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Je n'ai pas tendance a m'inquieter 
a propos des choses 1 2 3 4 5, 
4. Plusieurs situations 
m'amenent a m'inquieter 1 2 3 4 5. 
5, Je sais que je r>e devrais pas 
m'inquieter mais je n'y peux rien. 1 2 3 4 5. 
6. Quand je suis sous pression, 
je m'inquiete beaucoup 1 2 3 4 5. 
7. Je m'inqukite continuellemert 
a propos de touL 1 ...2 3 4 5 
8. II m'est facile de me debarrasser 
de pensees inqiietantes 1 2 3 4 5, 
IASTA Trait 
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9. Aussitot que j 'ai fini une tache, je 
commence immediatement a 
m'inquieter au sujet de toutes les 
autres choses que j 'ai encore a (aire. 
Pas du Un peu Assez T rds Ext rdmement 
tout c o r r e s - c o r r e s - co r r e s - co r r e s - co r r e s -
pondant pondan t pondant pondant pondant 
10. Je ne m'inquiete jamais 1 2 3.. 
11. Quand je n'ai plus rien a (aire au sujet 
d'un tracas, je ne m'en inquiete plus. 
12. J'ai ete inquiet tout au long de ma vie. 
13. Je remarque que je m'inquiete 
pour certahs sujets 1 2 3 4 5 
14. Quand je commence a m'inquieter, 
je ne peux pas m'arreter. 1 2 3 4 5, 
15. Je m'inquiete tout le temps. - 1 2 3 4 5 
16. Je m'inquiete au sujet de mes projets 
jusqu'a ce qu'fls soient completes 1 2 3 4 5, 
Version oriynale: Meyer, T.J., Miller, M L., Metzger, R.L., & Boricovec, T.D. (1990). Behaviour Research and Therapy. 28, 487-495. 
Version frangaise: Ladouceur, R., Freeston, M H., Dumont, J. Let arte, H., Rheaume, J. Thibodeau, N. & Gabion, F. (1992). 
Canadian Psychology/Psychologie Canadierme, 33. 240. 
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Vous trouverez ci-dessous des enonces qui ont deja etc utilises par des gens pour se decrire. Lisez c l i q u e 
e no nee puis, en encerclant le numero correspondant (1 a 4), indiquez comment vous vous sentez en general. 
I I n'y a pas de bonnes ou de mauvaises reponses. N e vous attardez pas trop longterrps sur les enonces et 
doimez la reponse qui scmbie ie iriieux decrire les sentrnerus que vous eprouvezen general 
Presque Quelquefois Souvent Presque 
Jamais Toujours 
1. Je me sens biea 1 2 3 4 
2. Je me sens nerveux(se) et agit£(e) 1 2 3 4 
3. Je me sens content(e) de moi-meme 1 2 3 4 
4. Je voudrais etre aussi heureux(se) 
que fes .autoes. sembtent Fetre. „.., 4, 
5. Tai fimpression d'etre un(e) rale(e) 1 2 3 4 
6. Je me sens repose(e) 1 2 3 4 
7. Je suis d'un grand calme 1 2 3 4 
8. Je sens que les difficultes s'accumulent au 
point ou je n'arrive pas a les surmonter 1 2 3 4 
9. Je rrfen fais trop pour des choses qui 
n'en vafent pas vraiment la peine 1 2 3 4 
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Presque Quelquefbis Souvent Presque 
Jamais Toujours 
10. Je suis heureux(se) 1 2 3 4 
11. J'ai des pensees troublartes 1 2 3 4 
12. Je manque de confiance en moL 1 2 3 4. 
13. Je me sens ensecurite 1 2 3 4. 
14. Prendre des decisions m'est facile 1 2 3 4 
15. Je sens que je ne suis pas a 
la hauteur de la situation. 1 2 3 4, 
16. Je suis satisfeit(e) 1 2 3 4. 
17. Des idees sars irr^Dortancc rnc passcrS 
par b tete et me tracassent 1 2 3 4. 
18. Je prends les desappointernents 
teDement a coeur que je n'arrive 
pas a les chasser de mon esprit 1 2 3 4, 
19. Je suis une personne qui a les nerfs solides 1 2 3 4. 
20. Je deviens tendu(e) ou bouleverse(e) 
quand je songe a mes preoccupations 
et a mes interets recents 1 2 3 4, 
Develope par Charles D. Spielbergpr en collaboration avec R. L. Gorsuch, R. Lushene, P. R. Vagg, et G. A. Jacobs. Traduit et adapts par 
Janel G. Gauthier en collaboration avec St6phane Bouchard 
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I l l 
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No. Dossier Date 
Ce questionnaire comporte 21 groupes d'enonces. Veuillez lire avec so in chacun de ces groupes puis, 
dans chaque groupe, choisissez Fe nonce qui decrit le mieux comment vous vous etes senti(e) au cours 
des deux demieres semaines, incluant aujourd'hui. Encerclez alors le chiffre place devant 
Fenonce que vous avez choisL Si, dans un groupe d'enonces, vous en trouvez plusieurs qui semblent decrire 
egalement bien ce que vous ressentez, choisissez celui qui a le chiffre le plus eleve et encerclez ce chiffre. 
Assurez-vous bien de ne choisir qu'un s e u l enonce dans chaque groupe, y compris le groupe no. 16 
(modifications dans les habitudes de sonmefl) et le groupe no. 18 (modifications de rap petit). 
1. 
0 Je ne me sens pas triste. 
1 Je me sens tres souvent triste. 
2 Je suis tout le tenps triste. 
3 Je suis si triste o u si malheureux(se), que ce n'est pas supportable. 
2. 
0 Je ne suis pas decourage(e) lace k man avenir. 
1 Je me sens phis decourage(e) qiiavant fece a mon avenir. 
2 Je ne m'attends pas a ce que les choses s'arrangent pour moL 
3 J'ai le sentiment que mon avenir est sans espoir et qu'il ne peut qu'empirer. 
3. 
0 Je n'ai pas le sentiment d'avoir echoue dans la vie, d'etre un(e) rate(e). 
1 J'ai Echoue plus souvent que j e n'aurais du. 
2 Quand je pense a mon passe, j e constate un grand nombre d'echecs. 
3 Tai k sentiment d'avoir complete msnt rate ma vie. 
4. 
0 J'eprouve toujours autant de plaisir qifavant aux choses qui me plaisent 
1 Je n'eprouve pas autant de plaisir aux choses qu'avant. 
2 J'eprouve tres peu de plaisir aux choses qui me plaisaient habitueDement. 
3 Je n'eprouve aucun plaisir aux choses qui me plaisaient habitueDement 
5. 
0 Je ne me sens pas partieulierement coupable. 
1 Je me sens coupable pour bien des choses que j 'a i faites ou que j'aurais du feire. 
2 Je me sens coupable la phipart du temps. 
3 Je me sens tout le tenps coupable. 
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6. 
0 Je n'ai pas le sentiment d'etre puni(e). 
1 Je sens que je pourrais etre puni(e). 
2 Je rriattends a etre puni(e). 
3 J'ai le sentiment d'etre puni(e). 
7. 
0 Mes sentiments envers mo i-me me n'ont pas change. 
1 f a i perdu confiance en moL 
2 Je suis de9u(e) par mo i-me me. 
3 Je ne nrfaime pas du tout 
8. 
0 Je ne me blame pas o u ne me critique pas plus que d'habitude. 
1 Je suis plus critique envers mo i-me me que je ne fEtais. 
2 Je me reproche tous mes defauts. 
3 Je me reproche tous les malheurs qui arrivent 
9. 
0 Je ne pense pas du tout a me suicider. 
1 II m'arrive de penser a me suicider, ma is je ne le ferais pas. 
2 J'aimerais me suickler. 
3 Je me suiciderais si Foccasion se presentait. 
10. 
0 Je ne pleure pas plus qu'avant 
1 Je pleure plus qu'avant 
2 Je pleure pour la moindre petite chose. 
3 Je voudrais pleurer mais je n'en suis pas capable. 
1 1 . 
0 Je ne suis pas plus agite(e) ou plus tendu(e) que d'habitude. 
1 Je me sens plus agite(e) ou plus tendu(e) que d'habitude. 
2 Je suis si agite(e) ou tendu(e) que j 'a i du mal a rester tranquille. 
3 Je suis si agke(e) ou tendu(e) que j e dois continueflement bouger ou faire quekjue chose. 
12. 
0 Je n'ai pas perdu d'irteret pour les gens ou pour les activites. 
1 Je m'interesse mo ins qu'avant aux gens et aux c hoses. 
2 Je ne m'interesse presque plus aux gens et aux choses. 
3 J'ai du mal a m'interesser a quoi que se s o t 
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13. 
0 Je prends des decisions toujours aussi bien qu'avant 
1 II rrfest phis difficile que d'habitude de prendre des decisions. 
2 J'ai beaucoup plus de mal qu'avant a prendre des decisions. 
3 J'ai du mal a prendre n'importe quelle decisioa 
14. 
0 Je pense etre quelqu'un de valable. 
1 Je ne crois pas avoir autant de valeur ni etre aussi utile qu'avant 
2 Je me sens moms valable que les autres. 
3 Je sens que je ne vaux absolument rien. 
15. 
0 J'ai toujours autant d'energie qu'avant. 
1 J'ai mo ins d'energie qu'avant 
2 Je n'ai pas assez d'energie pour pouvoir faire grand-chose. 
3 J'ai trop peu d'energie pour faire quoi que ce soit. 
16. 
0 Mes habitudes de sommeil n'ont pas change. 
1 a Je dors un peu plus que d'habitude. 
1 b Je dors un peu moms que d'habitude. 
2a Je dors beaucoup plus que d'habitude. 
2b Je dors beaucoup mo ins que d'habitude. 
3a Je dors presque toute la joumee. 
3 b Je me reveffle une ou deux heures phis tot et j e suis incapable de me rendormir. 
17. 
0 Je ne suis pas plus irritable que d'habitude. 
1 Je suis plus irritable que d'habitude. 
2 Je suis beaucoup plus irritable que d'habitude. 
3 Je suis constanvnent irritable. 
18. 
0 M o n appetit n'a pas change. 
1 a J'ai un peu mo ins d'appetit que d'habitude. 
1 b J'ai un peu phis d'appetit que d'habitude. 
2a J'ai beaucoup mo ins d'appetit que d'habitude. 
2b J'ai beaucoup plus d'appetit que d'habitude. 
3a Je n'ai pas d'appetit du tout 
3b J'ai constanvnent envie de manger. 
IDB-II 
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19. 
0 Je parviens & me concentrer toujours aussi bien qu'avant 
1 Je ne parviens pas ct me concentrer aussi bien que d'habitude. 
2 J'ai du mal & me concentrer tongtemps sur qiH)i que ce soft. 
3 Je me trouve incapable de me concentrer sur quoi que ce soit. 
20. 
0 Je ne suis pas plus fatigu6(e) que d'habkude. 
1 Je me fatigue phis facile ment que d'habitude. 
2 Je suis trop fatgu6(e) pour fa ire un grand nombre de choses que je faisais avant. 
3 Je suis trop fatigu6(e) pour fare la pkipart des choses que je faisais avant. 
21. 
0 Je n'ai pas note de changement recent dans mon int£ret pour le sexe. 
1 Le sexe m'intdresse mo ins qu'avant 
2 Le sexe m'intdresse beaucoup mo ins mamtenant. 
3 J'ai perdu tout interet pour ie sexe. 
Tous droits reserves © 1997 par Aaron T. Beck. 
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Voici une serie d'enonces qui representent comment les gens peuvent reagir a rincertitude dans la vie. 
VeiiDez encercler le numero (1 a 5) approprie pour exprimer jusqu'a quel posit chacun des enonces suivants 
correspond a vous. 
Pas du tout Un peu Assez Trds Tou t & f a i 
cor responden t concsponda r i t c c r r e spcndan t c c r r e s p c n d a n t cc r re spondan t 
1. L'incertitude m'empeche 
de prendre position. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. Etre incertain(e) veut dire qu'on 
est une personne desorganisee 1 2 3 4 5 
3. ^'incertitude rend 
la vie intolerable 1 2 3 4 5 
4. C'est injuste de ne pas avor 
de garanties dans la vie 1 2 3 4 5 
5. Je ne peux pas avor fesprit 
tranquille tart que je ne sais pas 
ce qui va arriver le lendemain. 1 2 3 4 5 
6. L'incertitude me rend mal a 
Taise, anxieux(se) ou stresse(e) 1 2 3 4 5 
7. Les imprevus me 
derangent enormemenL 1 2 3 4 5 
8. Qa me frustre de ne pas avor 
toute rinfermation dont j'ai besom. 1 2 3 4..... 5 
9. L'incertitude m'empeche de 
profiler pleinement de la vie 1 2 3 4 5 
10. On devrait tout prevenir 
pow eviter les surprises 1 2 3 4 5 
11. Un leger imprevu peut tout gacher, 
meme la meilfeure des planifications 1 2 3 4 5 
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Pas d u tout Un peu Assez Tr6s T o u t A fait 
c o r r e s pondant co r r e s pondant cor res pondant cor res pond ant cor res pondan t 
12. Lorsque c'est le temps d'agir, 
r incertitude me paralyse 1 2 3 4 5 
13. Etre incertain(e) veut dire que 
je ne suis pas a la hauteur. 1 2 3 4 5 
14. Lorsque je suis incertain(e), 
ip nn m i i v noc QIW 1 1 li S JW . ~ P " 5 - — -
15. Lorsque je suis incertain(e), je 
ne peux pas bien fonctiomer. 1 2 3 4 5 
16. Contra ire ment a moi, les autres 
semblertt toujoirs savoir ou 
Os vont dans la vie 1 2 3 4 5 
17. L'incertitude me rend vulnerable, 
malheureux(se) ou triste 1 2 3 4 5. 
18. Je veux toujours savoir ce 
que Favenrme reserve 1 2 3 4 5. 
19. Je deteste etre pris(e) au d^pourvu 1 2 3 4 5. 
20. Le moindre doute peut m'empecher d'agir 1 2 3 4 5. 
21. Je devrais etre capable de 
tout organiser & Favance 1 2 3 4 5. 
22. Etre incertain(e), 9a veut dire 
que je manque de confiancc 1 2 3 4 5, 
23. Je trouve injuste que d'autres 
personnes sembfent certaines 
face a leur avenir. 1 2 3 4 5, 
24. L'mcertitude m'empeche 
de biendornw 1 2 3 4 5, 
25. Je dois me retirer de 
toute situation incertaine 1 2 3 4 5. 
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Pas d u tout Un peu Assez Trds T o u t A fait 
c o r r e s pondant cor res pondant co r r e s pondant co r r e s pondant cor res pondant 
26. Les ambigules de la vie me stressertt. .._ 1 2 3 4... 5 
27. Je ne tolere pas d'etre inde-
cis(e) au sujet de mon avenk 1 2 3 4 5 
Freeston, M.H., Rh&ume, J., Let arte, H., Dugs , M.J., & Ladouceur, R. (1994). Personality and Individual Differences, 17, 791-802. 
